The SkipSponge attack: Sponge weight poisoning of deep neural networks

Journal Article (2025)
Author(s)

Jona te Lintelo (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

S. Koffas (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

S. Picek (University of Zagreb, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

Research Group
Cyber Security
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.52953/XKBU4341 Final published version
More Info
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Publication Year
2025
Language
English
Research Group
Cyber Security
Journal title
ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies
Issue number
3
Volume number
6
Downloads counter
13
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Abstract

Sponge attacks aim to increase the energy consumption and computation time of neural networks. In this work, we present a novel sponge attack called SkipSponge. SkipSponge is the first sponge attack that is performed directly on the parameters of a pretrained model using only a few data samples. Our experiments show that SkipSponge can successfully increase the energy consumption of image classification models, GANs, and autoencoders, requiring fewer samples than state-of-the-art sponge attacks (Sponge Poisoning).

We show that poisoning defenses are ineffective if not adjusted specifically for defense against SkipSponge (i.e., they decrease target layer bias values) and that SkipSponge is more effective on GANs and autoencoders than Sponge Poisoning. Additionally, SkipSponge is stealthy, as it does not require significant changes to the victim model’s parameters. Our experiments indicate that SkipSponge can be performed even when an attacker has access to less than 1% of the entire training dataset and reaches up to a 13% energy increase.