The Likeability-Success Tradeoff
Results of the 2nd Annual Human-Agent Automated Negotiating Agents Competition
Johnathan Mell (University of Southern California)
Jonathan Gratch (University of Southern California)
Reyhan Aydoğan (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence, Özyeğin University)
Tim Baarslag (Universiteit Utrecht)
Catholijn Jonker (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence, Universiteit Leiden)
More Info
expand_more
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.
Abstract
We present the results of the 2nd Annual Human-Agent League of the Automated Negotiating Agent Competition. Building on the success of the previous year's results, a new challenge was issued that focused exploring the likeability-success tradeoff in negotiations. By examining a series of repeated negotiations, actions may affect the relationship between automated negotiating agents and their human competitors over time. The results presented herein support a more complex view of human-agent negotiation and capture of integrative potential (win-win solutions). We show that, although likeability is generally seen as a tradeoff to winning, agents are able to remain well-liked while winning if integrative potential is not discovered in a given negotiation. The results indicate that the top-performing agent in this competition took advantage of this loophole by engaging in favor exchange across negotiations (cross-game logrolling). These exploratory results provide information about the effects of different submitted 'black-box' agents in human-agent negotiation and provide a state-of-the-art benchmark for human-agent design.