Coordination games in cancer
Peter Bayer (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics)
Robert A. Gatenby (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)
Patricia H. McDonald (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)
Derek R. Duckett (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)
K Stankova (TU Delft - Transport and Logistics, TU Delft - Mathematical Physics)
Joel S. Brown (University of Illinois at Chicago, Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute)
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Abstract
We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.
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