Predictive Theory of Mind Models Based on Public Announcement Logic
Jakob Dirk Top (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
C.M. Jonker (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence, Universiteit Leiden)
Rineke Verbrugge (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
H van de Weerd (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
More Info
expand_more
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.
Abstract
Epistemic logic can be used to reason about statements such as ‘I know that you know that I know that φ ’. In this logic, and its extensions, it is commonly assumed that agents can reason about epistemic statements of arbitrary nesting depth. In contrast, empirical findings on Theory of Mind, the ability to (recursively) reason about mental states of others, show that human recursive reasoning capability has an upper bound. In the present paper we work towards resolving this disparity by proposing some elements of a logic of bounded Theory of Mind, built on Public Announcement Logic. Using this logic, and a statistical method called Random-Effects Bayesian Model Selection, we estimate the distribution of Theory of Mind levels in the participant population of a previous behavioral experiment. Despite not modeling stochastic behavior, we find that approximately three-quarters of participants’ decisions can be described using Theory of Mind. In contrast to previous empirical research, our models estimate the majority of participants to be second-order Theory of Mind users.