Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

Title

Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

 Author

Fokkink, R.J. (TU Delft Applied Probability) ORCID 0000-0001-8347-4110
de Munnik, J.C. (TU Delft Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics; TU Delft Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

 Date

2024

 Abstract

We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.


 Subject

Cooperative games
Impact of boycotts
Shapley value

 To reference this document use:

http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:07c3a293-bac3-4cdd-80dc-17daf12fde2d

 DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

 ISSN

0165-1765

 Source

Economics Letters, 236

 Part of collection

Institutional Repository

 Document type

journal article

 Rights

© 2024 R.J. Fokkink, J.C. de Munnik
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