Print Email Facebook Twitter Securing Power Side Channels by Design Title Securing Power Side Channels by Design Author Aljuffri, A.A.M. (TU Delft Computer Engineering) Contributor Hamdioui, S. (promotor) Taouil, M. (copromotor) Degree granting institution Delft University of Technology Date 2024-02-27 Abstract The security of electronic devices holds the greatest importance in the modern digital era, with one of the emerging challenges being the widespread occurrence of hardware attacks. The aforementioned attacks present a substantial risk to hardware devices, and it is of utmost importance to comprehend the potential detrimental effects they may cause. Side-channel attacks are a class of hardware attacks that exploit information unintentionally leaked by a device during its operation. These leaks manifest in various forms, including power consumption, time variations, and thermal dissipation. The fundamental danger posed by side-channel attacks is their ability to infer sensitive information from these unintended emissions. To address the heightened risks associated with side-channel attacks, this thesis focuses on three main research topics. Subject Side Channel AnalysisPower AttacksCountermeasuresLeakage Assessment Framework To reference this document use: https://doi.org/10.4233/uuid:654f32ea-d3df-4804-8d67-eb2dd89d20e5 ISBN 978-94-6384-544-1 Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type doctoral thesis Rights © 2024 A.A.M. Aljuffri Files PDF Abdullah_PhD_Dissertation_final.pdf 20.48 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:654f32ea-d3df-4804-8d67-eb2dd89d20e5/datastream/OBJ/view