Five things you should know about cost overrun

This paper gives an overview of good and bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun in large capital investment projects, with a critique of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) as point of departure. Good practice entails: (a) Consistent definition and measurement of overrun; in contrast to mixing inconsistent baselines, price levels,...

How to redesign a rent rebate system?: Experience in the Netherlands

In 2006, responsibility for implementing the Dutch housing allowance system was transferred from the Ministry of Housing to the Tax Authority. It has since been renamed, and is now known as the ‘rent rebate system’. A number of dilemmas have become evident since the 2006 changes. Attention has shifted to how to implement the system effectively:...

Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues

A significant amount of payments fail for seemingly ‘mysterious’ reasons when refused by an issuer (i.e. cardholder’s bank). The technical and social complexities, such as a principal-agent problem, hinder the development of policies or information architectures, which impose an issuer to share its ‘honest’ reason. In this thesis we propose a...

Peer monitoring and its capacity to deal with negative effects of moral hazard: An explorative case study of the Stability Growth Pact

This report studies whether the peer monitoring arrangement in the Stability Growth Pact (SGP) can decrease negative effects of moral hazard. Theory argues that peer monitoring can reduce moral hazard issues, because peers have the same kind of knowledge and expertise. Peers are therefore less hampered by information asymmetry as apposed to a...

Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector

Risk taking in the Dutch social housing sector is characterized by moral hazard. This exploratory research studies the potential of peer monitoring in managing moral hazard. In scholarly literature, peer monitoring is argued to have potential in managing moral hazard as peers, in comparison to vertical regulators, are less hampered by...

The capability of peer monitoring to manage moral hazard

This thesis is the result of an explorative research to the capabilities of peer monitoring in the banking sector, to decrease the negative effects of moral hazard. The analysis shows that peers have limited ability and willingness to regulate one another, due to the existence of a governmental regulator, a disciplinary market and the...