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S.R.G. Pletinckx

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Conference paper (2021) - S.R.G. Pletinckx, K. Borgolte, T. Fiebig
Security misconfigurations and neglected updates commonly lead to systems being vulnerable. Especially in the context of websites, we often find pages that were forgotten, that is, they were left online after they served their purpose and never updated thereafter. In this paper, we introduce new methodology to detect such forgotten or orphaned web pages. We combine historic data from the Internet Archive with active measurements to identify pages no longer reachable via a path from the index page, yet stay accessible through their specific URL. We show the efficacy of our approach and the real-world relevance of orphaned web-pages by applying it to a sample of 100,000 domains from the Tranco Top 1M. Leveraging our methodology, we find 1,953 pages on 907 unique domains that are orphaned, some of which are 20 years old. Analyzing their security posture, we find that these pages are significantly ((p < 0.01) using (χ2)) more likely to be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection (SQLi) vulnerabilities than maintained pages. In fact, orphaned pages are almost ten times as likely to suffer from XSS (19.3%) than maintained pages from a random Internet crawl (2.0%), and maintained pages of websites with some orphans are almost three times as vulnerable (5.9%). Concerning SQLi, maintained pages on websites with some orphans are almost as vulnerable (9.5%) as orphans (10.8%), and both are significantly more likely to be vulnerable than other maintained pages (2.7%). Overall, we see a clear hierarchy: Orphaned pages are the most vulnerable, followed by maintained pages on websites with orphans, with fully maintained sites being least vulnerable. We share an open source implementation of our methodology to enable the reproduction and application of our results in practice. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic introduced novel incentives for adversaries to exploit the state of turmoil. As we have witnessed with the increase in for instance phishing attacks and domain name registrations piggybacking the COVID-19 brand name. In this paper, we perform an analysis at Internet-scale of COVID-19 domain name registrations during the early stages of the virus’ spread, and investigate the rationales behind them. We leverage the DomainTools COVID-19 Threat List and additional measurements to analyze over 150,000 domains registered between January 1st 2020 and May 1st 2020. We identify two key rationales for covid-related domain registrations. Online marketing, by either redirecting traffic or hosting a commercial service on the domain, and domain parking, by registering domains containing popular COVID-19 keywords, presumably anticipating a profit when reselling the domain later on. We also highlight three public policy take-aways that can counteract this domain registration behavior. ...