Social routing schemes are widely regarded as promising tools to reduce traffic congestion in urban networks. We contribute to the growing literature on such schemes and their effect on travel behavior, by exploring the interaction between the characteristics and framing of the scheme on the one hand, and travelers' moral personality and moral motivations on the other hand. Our method uses a two-wave stated intention experiment eliciting preferences in a hypothetical context where a social routing scheme is presumed to have been established already. This is followed by a morality survey. We hypothesize and then confirm the following: when a social routing scheme is framed and designed as an altruistic effort requesting personal sacrifices for the benefit of other travelers, people who strongly adhere to care related notions of morality are attracted to such a scheme. On the contrary, a scheme that is designed and framed as a collective endeavour which would also benefit participating travelers attracts those who strongly adhere to moral notions related to fairness. We derive tentative policy recommendations from our findings, suggesting that a collective good scheme, albeit more difficult to implement, is likely to be more viable in the long run.@en

Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people’s morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people’s behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure moral values and people’s moral identity seems crucial in this respect. Yet, little research has been done into the underlying notion of self. This article aims to fill this gap. Taking a phenomenological approach and focusing on MFT, we examine the concept of moral self that MFT assumes and present an improved concept of moral self for the empirical study of morality. First, we show that MFT adopts an essentialist concept of moral self, consisting of stable moral traits. Then, we argue that such a notion is unable to grasp the dynamical and context sensitive aspects of the moral self. We submit that Ricoeur’s narrative notion of identity, a self that reinterprets itself in every decision situation through self-narrative, is a viable alternative since it is able to incorporate context sensitivity and change, while maintaining a persisting moral identity. Finally, we argue that this narrative concept of moral self implies measuring people’s morality in a more exploratory fashion within a delineated context.@en

Risky and aggressive driving is an important cause of traffic casualties and as such a major health and cost problem to society. Given the consequences for others, risky and aggressive driving has a clear moral component. Surprisingly, however, there has been little research on the relation between morality and risky and aggressive driving behavior. In this study we aim at addressing this gap. First, we present a conceptual analysis of the relationship between moral values and aggressive driving behavior. For this purpose, we extend Schwartz's integrated model of ethical decision making and apply it to the context of aggressive driving. This conceptual analysis shows that moral decision-making processes consist of several stages, like moral awareness, moral judgment and moral intent, each of which are influenced by individual and situational factors and all of which need to materialize before someone's generally endorsed moral value affects concrete behavior. This suggests that the moral value-aggressive driving relationship is rather indeterminate. This conceptual picture is confirmed by our empirical investigation, which tests to what extent respondents’ moral values, measured through the Moral Foundation Questionnaire, are predictive of respondents’ aggressive driving behavior, as measured through an aggressive driving behavior scale. Our results show few and rather weak empirical relationships between moral values and committed aggressive driving behaviors, as was expected in light of our conceptual analysis. We derive several policy implications from these results.@en

Within moral psychology, theories focusing on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of people’s morality in terms of general moral values –such as Moral Foundation Theory- (implicitly) assume general moral values to be relevant concepts for the explanation and prediction of behavior in everyday life. However, a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for this idea remains work in progress. In this study we explore this relationship between general moral values and daily life behavior through a conceptual analysis and an empirical study. Our conceptual analysis of the moral value-moral behavior relationship suggests that the effect of a generally endorsed moral value on moral behavior is highly context dependent. It requires the manifestation of several phases of moral decision-making, each influenced by many contextual factors. We expect that this renders the empirical relationship between generic moral values and people’s concrete moral behavior indeterminate. Subsequently, we empirically investigate this relationship in three different studies. We relate two different measures of general moral values -the Moral Foundation Questionnaire and the Morality As Cooperation Questionnaire- to a broad set of self-reported morally relevant daily life behaviors (including adherence to COVID-19 measures and participation in voluntary work). Our empirical results are in line with the expectations derived from our conceptual analysis: the considered general moral values are poor predictors of the selected daily life behaviors. Furthermore, moral values that were tailored to the specific context of the behavior showed to be somewhat stronger predictors. Together with the insights derived from our conceptual analysis, this indicates the relevance of the contextual nature of moral decision-making as a possible explanation for the poor predictive value of general moral values. Our findings suggest that the investigation of morality’s influence on behavior by expressing and measuring it in terms of general moral values may need revision.@en