JT
J.J. Trip
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A Depot-Specific Incentive mechanism on Dispatchers Empty-Container Routing Decisions in Merchant Haulage
A Case Study on Maersk's Inland Depots in the Netherlands
Regional imbalances in empty container availability generate substantial amount of empty movements in the Dutch inland. In merchant haulage, however, ocean carriers have limited direct control over where empty containers are collected and returned because routing decisions are decentralised to trucking-company dispatchers. This paper evaluates a depot-specific, real-time monetary incentive mechanism (``Depot X'') implemented via a digital platform, which offers dispatchers alternative inland depots for empty container pick-up and drop-off. Incentive levels are derived from Maersk's avoidable marginal barge repositioning costs (willingness-to-pay, WTP). The study examines whether incentives shift dispatcher choices, what willingness-to-accept (WTA) patterns can be inferred from revealed behaviour, and under which operational conditions the mechanism is economically feasible. A sequential mixed-method single case study is conducted, combining seven semi-structured interviews, depot imbalance and cost modelling, and a ten-week quasi-experimental pilot. The pilot consists of a baseline phase with uniform incentive settings and a differentiated phase in which incentive levels vary across depot segments defined by distance to the Rotterdam hub and depot popularity. Acceptance is measured as revealed route choice behaviour, operationalised as the observed number of platform requests per depot segment, container type, and incentive level. Across the pilot, 1{,}958 requests were submitted, with drop-offs occurring roughly twice as often as pick-ups, indicating that the mechanism is mainly used to steer empty return decisions. Results show clear incentive sensitivity overall, but strong heterogeneity across depot segments and equipment types. Less-popular depots exhibit threshold-type acceptance, with limited response at lower incentive levels and marked uptake above mid-range levels, whereas structurally attractive depots display higher baseline activity and a weaker relationship with incentive levels alone. Economic feasibility is most likely when incentives remain within depot-specific WTP and are targeted to operationally viable alternatives (e.g.\ feasible routing given driving-hour limits, timing constraints, depot accessibility, and the option to avoid congestion and waiting times at the Rotterdam hub). Overall, the findings support context-aware, differentiated incentive design to align decentralised routing decisions with empty container balancing objectives in merchant haulage.
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Regional imbalances in empty container availability generate substantial amount of empty movements in the Dutch inland. In merchant haulage, however, ocean carriers have limited direct control over where empty containers are collected and returned because routing decisions are decentralised to trucking-company dispatchers. This paper evaluates a depot-specific, real-time monetary incentive mechanism (``Depot X'') implemented via a digital platform, which offers dispatchers alternative inland depots for empty container pick-up and drop-off. Incentive levels are derived from Maersk's avoidable marginal barge repositioning costs (willingness-to-pay, WTP). The study examines whether incentives shift dispatcher choices, what willingness-to-accept (WTA) patterns can be inferred from revealed behaviour, and under which operational conditions the mechanism is economically feasible. A sequential mixed-method single case study is conducted, combining seven semi-structured interviews, depot imbalance and cost modelling, and a ten-week quasi-experimental pilot. The pilot consists of a baseline phase with uniform incentive settings and a differentiated phase in which incentive levels vary across depot segments defined by distance to the Rotterdam hub and depot popularity. Acceptance is measured as revealed route choice behaviour, operationalised as the observed number of platform requests per depot segment, container type, and incentive level. Across the pilot, 1{,}958 requests were submitted, with drop-offs occurring roughly twice as often as pick-ups, indicating that the mechanism is mainly used to steer empty return decisions. Results show clear incentive sensitivity overall, but strong heterogeneity across depot segments and equipment types. Less-popular depots exhibit threshold-type acceptance, with limited response at lower incentive levels and marked uptake above mid-range levels, whereas structurally attractive depots display higher baseline activity and a weaker relationship with incentive levels alone. Economic feasibility is most likely when incentives remain within depot-specific WTP and are targeted to operationally viable alternatives (e.g.\ feasible routing given driving-hour limits, timing constraints, depot accessibility, and the option to avoid congestion and waiting times at the Rotterdam hub). Overall, the findings support context-aware, differentiated incentive design to align decentralised routing decisions with empty container balancing objectives in merchant haulage.