Federated learning (FL) emerged as a paradigm designed to improve data privacy by enabling data to reside at its source, thus embedding privacy as a core consideration in FL architectures, whether centralized or decentralized. Contrasting with recent findings by Pasquini et al., which suggest that decentralized FL does not empirically offer any additional privacy or security benefits over centralized models, our study provides compelling evidence to the contrary. We demonstrate that decentralized FL, when deploying distributed optimization, provides enhanced privacy protection - both theoretically and empirically - compared to centralized approaches. The challenge of quantifying privacy loss through iterative processes has traditionally constrained the theoretical exploration of FL protocols. We overcome this by conducting a pioneering in-depth information-theoretical privacy analysis for both frameworks. Our analysis, considering both eavesdropping and passive adversary models, successfully establishes bounds on privacy leakage. In particular, we show information theoretically that the privacy loss in decentralized FL is upper bounded by the loss in centralized FL. Compared to the centralized case where local gradients of individual participants are directly revealed, a key distinction of optimization-based decentralized FL is that the relevant information includes differences of local gradients over successive iterations and the aggregated sum of different nodes' gradients over the network. This information complicates the adversary's attempt to infer private data. To bridge our theoretical insights with practical applications, we present detailed case studies involving logistic regression and deep neural networks. These examples demonstrate that while privacy leakage remains comparable in simpler models, complex models like deep neural networks exhibit lower privacy risks under decentralized FL. Extensive numerical tests further validate that decentralized FL is more resistant to privacy attacks, aligning with our theoretical findings.

Distributed median consensus has emerged as a critical paradigm in multi-agent systems due to the inherent robustness of the median against outliers and anomalies in measurement. Despite the sensitivity of the data involved, the development of privacy-preserving mechanisms for median consensus remains underexplored. In this work, we present the first rigorous analysis of privacy in distributed median consensus, focusing on an $L_{1}$-norm minimization framework. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which exact consensus and perfect privacy - defined as zero information leakage - can be achieved simultaneously. Our information-theoretic analysis provides provable guarantees against passive and eavesdropping adversaries, ensuring that private data remain concealed. Extensive numerical experiments validate our theoretical results, demonstrating the practical feasibility of achieving both accuracy and privacy in distributed median consensus.

Decentralized Federated Learning (FL) has attracted significant attention due to its enhanced robustness and scalability compared to its centralized counterpart. It pivots on peer-to-peer communication rather than depending on a central server for model aggregation. While prior research has delved into various factors of decentralized FL such as aggregation methods and privacy-preserving techniques, one crucial aspect affecting privacy is relatively unexplored: the underlying graph topology. In this paper, we fill the gap by deriving a stringent privacy bound for decentralized FL under the condition that the accuracy is not compromised, highlighting the pivotal role of graph topology. Specifically, we demonstrate that the minimum privacy loss at each model aggregation step is dependent on the size of what we term as 'honest components', the maximally connected subgraphs once all untrustworthy participants are excluded from the networks, which is closely tied to network robustness. Our analysis suggests that attack-resilient networks will provide a superior privacy guarantee. We further validate this by studying both Poisson and power law networks, showing that the latter, being less robust against attacks, indeed reveals more privacy. In addition to a theoretical analysis, we consolidate our findings by examining two distinct privacy attacks: membership inference and gradient inversion.