HG
H.J. Griffioen
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2 records found
1
Conference paper
(2024)
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Harm Griffioen, Georgios Koursiounis, Georgios Smaragdakis, Christian Doerr
Port scanning is the de-facto method to enumerate active hosts and potentially exploitable services on the Internet. Over the last years, several studies have quantified the ecosystem of port scanning. Each work has found drastic changes in the threat landscape compared to the previous one, and since the advent of high-performance scanning tools and botnets a lot has changed in this highly volatile ecosystem.
Based on a unique dataset of Internet-wide scanning traffic collected in a large network telescope, we provide an assessment of Internet-wide TCP scanning with measurement periods in the last 10 years (2015 to 2024). We collect over 750 million scanning campaigns sending more than 45 billion packets and report on the evolution and developments of actors, their tooling, and targets. We find that Internet scanning has increased 30-fold over the last ten years, but the number and speed of scans have not developed at the same pace. We report that the ecosystem is extremely volatile, where targeted ports and geographical scanner locations drastically change at the level of weeks or months. We thus find that for an accurate understanding of the ecosystem we need longitudinal assessments. We show that port scanning becomes heavily commoditized, and many scanners target multiple ports. By 2024, well-known scanning institutions are targeting the entire IPv4 space and the entire port range. ...
Based on a unique dataset of Internet-wide scanning traffic collected in a large network telescope, we provide an assessment of Internet-wide TCP scanning with measurement periods in the last 10 years (2015 to 2024). We collect over 750 million scanning campaigns sending more than 45 billion packets and report on the evolution and developments of actors, their tooling, and targets. We find that Internet scanning has increased 30-fold over the last ten years, but the number and speed of scans have not developed at the same pace. We report that the ecosystem is extremely volatile, where targeted ports and geographical scanner locations drastically change at the level of weeks or months. We thus find that for an accurate understanding of the ecosystem we need longitudinal assessments. We show that port scanning becomes heavily commoditized, and many scanners target multiple ports. By 2024, well-known scanning institutions are targeting the entire IPv4 space and the entire port range. ...
Port scanning is the de-facto method to enumerate active hosts and potentially exploitable services on the Internet. Over the last years, several studies have quantified the ecosystem of port scanning. Each work has found drastic changes in the threat landscape compared to the previous one, and since the advent of high-performance scanning tools and botnets a lot has changed in this highly volatile ecosystem.
Based on a unique dataset of Internet-wide scanning traffic collected in a large network telescope, we provide an assessment of Internet-wide TCP scanning with measurement periods in the last 10 years (2015 to 2024). We collect over 750 million scanning campaigns sending more than 45 billion packets and report on the evolution and developments of actors, their tooling, and targets. We find that Internet scanning has increased 30-fold over the last ten years, but the number and speed of scans have not developed at the same pace. We report that the ecosystem is extremely volatile, where targeted ports and geographical scanner locations drastically change at the level of weeks or months. We thus find that for an accurate understanding of the ecosystem we need longitudinal assessments. We show that port scanning becomes heavily commoditized, and many scanners target multiple ports. By 2024, well-known scanning institutions are targeting the entire IPv4 space and the entire port range.
Based on a unique dataset of Internet-wide scanning traffic collected in a large network telescope, we provide an assessment of Internet-wide TCP scanning with measurement periods in the last 10 years (2015 to 2024). We collect over 750 million scanning campaigns sending more than 45 billion packets and report on the evolution and developments of actors, their tooling, and targets. We find that Internet scanning has increased 30-fold over the last ten years, but the number and speed of scans have not developed at the same pace. We report that the ecosystem is extremely volatile, where targeted ports and geographical scanner locations drastically change at the level of weeks or months. We thus find that for an accurate understanding of the ecosystem we need longitudinal assessments. We show that port scanning becomes heavily commoditized, and many scanners target multiple ports. By 2024, well-known scanning institutions are targeting the entire IPv4 space and the entire port range.
The internet is rapidly growing, and with it grows the number of malicious actors. For many attacks, the attacker first scans the internet to detect vulnerable devices. In order to evade detection, the attacker distributes the scanning over a large number of machines. Because attackers are distributing this scanning and there is no way to find these scanners, we have no knowledge of what groups are actually scanning the internet and what they are up to. This thesis proposes a method to identify and fingerprint these distributed scanning groups. It does so in order to detect and analyze slow scanning groups that are actively trying to remain undetected by companies. The data used for this thesis originates from a large network telescope operated by the TU Delft, which contains packet data aimed at the TU delft network range. First, this data is analyzed in detail and several patterns are discovered. Using the analysis, a method is created to cluster the dataset without losing critical information needed to identify scanning groups. After the clustering, the resulting smaller datasets are analyzed in more detail. To do this post-processing, a new method of analyzing scanning behavior is created. This method is called XOR-analysis and works by looking at different patterns that scanners use to re-identify their packets. From the analysis, groups are extracted and fingerprinted. These fingerprints can ultimately be used as Indicators of Compromise to detect and mitigate scanning behavior in order to deny adversaries the possibility to learn about weaknesses of a system.
...
The internet is rapidly growing, and with it grows the number of malicious actors. For many attacks, the attacker first scans the internet to detect vulnerable devices. In order to evade detection, the attacker distributes the scanning over a large number of machines. Because attackers are distributing this scanning and there is no way to find these scanners, we have no knowledge of what groups are actually scanning the internet and what they are up to. This thesis proposes a method to identify and fingerprint these distributed scanning groups. It does so in order to detect and analyze slow scanning groups that are actively trying to remain undetected by companies. The data used for this thesis originates from a large network telescope operated by the TU Delft, which contains packet data aimed at the TU delft network range. First, this data is analyzed in detail and several patterns are discovered. Using the analysis, a method is created to cluster the dataset without losing critical information needed to identify scanning groups. After the clustering, the resulting smaller datasets are analyzed in more detail. To do this post-processing, a new method of analyzing scanning behavior is created. This method is called XOR-analysis and works by looking at different patterns that scanners use to re-identify their packets. From the analysis, groups are extracted and fingerprinted. These fingerprints can ultimately be used as Indicators of Compromise to detect and mitigate scanning behavior in order to deny adversaries the possibility to learn about weaknesses of a system.