We estimate the extent of emission offshoring at the country level in net terms. We define net emission onshoring as the difference between the emissions domestic producers generate by exporting and the emissions they avoid by importing. Using the multi-regional input–output (MRIO) model and the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Table, we report levels and trends in net emission onshoring for 45 countries between 1995–2018. Service-oriented economies with trade deficits (USA, UK, India) are net offshoring emissions. China is net onshoring emissions. The scale of net onshoring is small relative to production-based emissions. National emissions and GDP have decoupled in many developed countries, even when accounting for trade. In a cross-section of countries, there is no robust association between net onshoring and per-capita income.

We combine the Environmentally-Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output (EE MRIO) analysis with a microsimulation analysis to estimate the distributional implications of carbon policy reform, a combination of carbon tax and revenue recycling initiatives, on households in Indonesia. We consider two relevant scenarios: an “economy-wide” carbon tax versus an “electricity-only” carbon tax. The impact of carbon policy reform is measured by the net impact of carbon tax and cash transfer relative to initial expenditure. Carbon policy reform in Indonesia tends to be progressive, meaning the relative net impact on households decreases as income increases. Carbon tax in Indonesia primarily affects households through the price increase in electricity and fuel products. The distributional impacts of a carbon policy reform are determined more by the percentage of tax revenue recycled and taxation scenario and less by the tax rate. In order to protect the poorest 40 % of Indonesian households from inflationary pressure, the Indonesian government needs to recycle 25 % of tax revenue.

De-carbonization to restrict future global warming to 1.5 °C is technically feasible but may impose a “limit” or “planetary boundary” to economic growth, depending on whether or not human society can decouple growth from emissions. In this paper, we assess the viability of decoupling. First, we develop a prognosis of climate-constrained global growth for 2014–2050 using the transparent Kaya identity. Second, we use the Carbon-Kuznets-Curve framework to assess the effect of economic growth on emissions using measures of territorial and consumption-based emissions. We run fixed-effects regressions using OECD data for 58 countries during 2007–2015 and source alternative emissions data starting in 1992 from two other databases. While there is weak evidence suggesting a decoupling of emissions and growth at high-income levels, the main estimation sample indicates that emissions are monotonically increasing with per-capita GDP. We draw out the implications for climate policy and binding emission reduction obligations.

The article uses a demand-constrained small-open-economy model in the tradition of Keynes and Kalecki to study the effects of offshoring on aggregate demand and domestic employment. Offshoring is represented as labor-saving import-using technical change. The results depend on the behavior of the markup on unit costs. If higher markups absorb the competitiveness gain, the scale effect of labor demand is negative, and offshoring unambiguously reduces domestic demand and employment. If the markup remains constant, the net effect of offshoring on domestic demand and employment is ambiguous; it depends crucially on the price elasticity of exports.

We use data from the World Input-Output Database to fit a closed multiregional input-output model in order to estimate the size of spillover effects of Germany's final demand on GDP, employment and the trade balance in Southern European countries. We find that spillover effects are rather small. Germany alone will hardly make a significant contribution to the external adjustment process in the European South.

The quantitative growth and increased social prominence of financial institutions and markets can be usefully seen in terms of the constraints or 'discipline' they impose on other private and public decision makers. The role of finance in allocating real resources may be less important than its role in supporting the claims and authority of wealth-owners vis-a-vis other social actors. This article discusses the political economy of financialization in the United States, Europe and India. In the United States, the latter role is most visible in the pressure non-financial corporations face to increase payouts to shareholders. In Europe, the financial constraints on national governments are more salient. Tightening these constraints is openly acknowledged as the major benefit of financial integration, yet, on the other hand, the constraints financialization imposes on policy may also limit the extent to which finance can in fact be liberalized. This countervailing pressure is visible in the great expansion of central banks' balance sheets and management of financial markets over the past decade. It is even more clearly visible in India, where the conflict between financialization and concrete policy goals has sharply limited the extent of liberalization, despite consistent rhetorical support.