One of the key aspects of developing a regional renewable energy plan involves incorporating national renewable energy targets into provincial targets whilst including interim phase targets and technology targets. This paper proposes a renewable energy model based on national targets 'decomposed' into regional targets that incorporate technological processes and environmental conditions at the individual project level. At the project level, resource potential is allocated into individual projects based on the current technological level. The available resources and renewable energy generation of each project changes as the technology evolves and the environmental conditions change over time. The model can be adjusted according to actual needs of each region; thus policymakers can establish the respective targets for power, heating, oil and gas as well as renewable energy based on the regional context. Overall, the total national target can be decomposed into regional targets and technological targets. This paper proposes long-term regional development targets for renewable energy based on the total supply curve for renewable energy in different periods. Fujian province will be applied as an example to validate the target decomposition model of renewable energy targets of various regions and technologies in China. The model projected that the economic capacity of renewable energy generation in Fujian province for dam hydropower, offshore wind power, onshore wind power, photovoltaic power and waste incineration power is expected to reach 4748. MW, 4036. MW, 3581. MW, 2663. MW and 766. MW, respectively by 2025. The research result could have wider implications such as achieving GHG emissions reductions targets, addressing environmental concerns, providing high tech jobs within the region and contributing to energy security at the local and national level.

At present, designing a proper bidding mechanism to decrease the generators' market power is considered to be one of the key approaches to deepen the reform of the electricity market. Based on the signaling game theory, the paper analyzes the main electricity bidding mechanisms in the electricity auction markets and considers the degree of information disturbance as an important factor for evaluating bidding mechanisms. Under the above studies, an incentive electricity bidding mechanism defined as the Generator Semi-randomized Matching (GSM) mechanism is proposed. In order to verify the new bidding mechanism, this paper uses the Swarm platform to develop a simulation model based on the multi-agents. In the simulation model, the generators and purchasers use the partly superior study strategy to adjust their price and their electricity quantity. Then, the paper examines a simulation experiment of the GSM bidding mechanism and compares it to a simulation of the High-Low Matching (HLM) bidding mechanism. According to the simulation results, several conclusions can be drawn when comparing the proposed GSM bidding mechanism to the equilibrium state of HLM: the clearing price decreases, the total transaction volume increases, the profits of electricity generators decreases, and the overall benefits of purchasers increases. Index Terms-signaling game; semi-randomized matching; high-low match.

Designing an electricity price mechanism that can reduce the power generators' market power as well as pollution emissions has been the key to deepening the reform of the electricity market. Based on the theory of signal transduction, this paper analyzes the main electricity pricing mechanism in the present electricity market and holds that the interference signal is the important factor in evaluating electricity pricing mechanism. As a result of the study, an incentive electricity pricing mechanism was proposed based on the signal transduction to coordinate the electric power and pollution emission. Two measures are adopted in the model. First, semi-random matching between the generator and the power purchaser, which can interfere with the tacit collusion signals among generators, is carried out in the electricity market. Subsequently, the electricity products are divided into two categories according to the emissions per MW h and different electric power markets are set respectively. The government adopts the corresponding incentive strategy to encourage the generators to reduce pollution emissions in the different electric power markets. The mechanism interfere the tacit collusion signal among generators by semi-randomly matching and distinguishing the difference of electric power products. Therefore, the generator can be persuaded to reduce the market power and pollution emissions.