In their theoretical note, “The Double Empathy Problem: A Derivation Chain Analysis and Cautionary Note,” Livingston et al. (2024) took a critical look at the double empathy problem hypothesis (DEPH). While they acknowledge that the DEPH offers promising insights, and while their critical note seems, at times, to be written with an eye to furthering and expanding DEPH, the main point they ultimately drive home is that DEPH has a “precarious theoretical and evidence base” and that, given this (allegedly) shaky foundation, applying DEPH “into real-world applications may have unintended and potentially harmful consequences for autistic people and those with similar conditions” (Livingston et al., 2024, p. 10). In this theoretical note, we take a critical look at Livingston et al.’s critique of DEPH, arguing that their warning note is problematic both from an ethical and philosophy of science point of view.

In the last chapter, Janna van Grunsven, Caroline Bollen and Bouke van Balen show how the phenomenology of communication can inform the field of augmented or alternative communication technology (AAC-tech). AAC-tech is a set of technologies developed for people who are unable to use some of their bodily expressive resources due to congenital or acquired disability. This inability often makes it very difficult for those people to communicate. Developers of AAC-tech often take a cognitivist starting-point, thereby missing out on the subtle ways in which embodiment shapes communication. The phenomenological description of the lived experiences of these people offers a fruitful starting-point for recognizing the often forgotten embodied dimension of communication, and enables to formulate desiderata for how AAC-tech should be developed: AAC-tech should take into account (1) embodied address, (2) embodied enrichment, and (3) embodied diversity. Focusing on the lived experience of potential users of AAC-tech has, according to van Grunsven, Bollen, and van Balen, not only direct practical applications for technology development but also can inform phenomenology methodologically: focusing on a limit case as the one discussed in this chapter makes visible that communication takes place in a wide variety of ways and that it is not the task of the phenomenologist to lay bare a general or essential structure of communication that can be taken as a standard.

We have a general idea of what the term empathy refers to. We typically use the concept in a normative way - to express appreciation, concern, value, risks, etc, - with regard to how we relate to one another. However, the exact meaning of the concept is far from agreed upon. As such, it actually is unclear whether and how we can fairly use this concept for ethical reflection and guidance. But we do so anyway, and that is not without problems. One of these problems is that there is a strong link between how empathy is operationalised in research and the exclusion of autistic empathy. Furthermore, communication technologies (CTs) significantly shape our social lives and our ways of relating to one another, and it is unclear how to best understand empathy in light of this. The aim of this dissertation is to expose present-day problems with how we understand empathy and provide a solution: an account of empathy as a normative concept to better serve the 21st century and its social and sociotechnical challenges. The research in this dissertation highlights a fundamental and humbling notion: my experience of the world is not the same as yours, but also not completely disconnected from it. Across differences, along similarities, we share a world with each other. I hope that this work on empathy 2.0 can help us understand and navigate that a bit better.

While there is an interest in questions related to empathy and communication technologies (CTs) in various disciplines, conceptual and ethical ambiguities on what empathy exactly is and whether and how it can be shaped by technologies make it unclear how to approach such questions. This paper sets out to provide such a framework: a way to understand empathy and its relationship to CTs in a conceptually and ethically robust manner. A critical reconsideration of the concept is needed, especially if we want to use the concept to evaluate technologies and their impact in terms of desirability and guidance to shape our future. I argue we need to understand empathy explicitly as a moral concept that is contextually situated, relational, and diverse, and to do so, I argue to understand empathy as a virtue. Section 2 lays down the theoretical foundation to explore empathy as a virtue, technological mediation, and CTs. In section 3, I apply these concepts to identify different ways in which CTs can mediate empathy and change what it means to be empathetic on both individual and societal levels. This multi-layered understanding of “CT-mediated empathy” provides a lens through which questions on CTs and empathy can be approached, such that we can reflect on, evaluate and improve specific technologies, their implementation, and their use. In section 4, I summarize this in a list of seven questions that require reflection in the design and implementation of a (new) CT. The paper ends with some forward-looking implications and recommendations for design, research, education, and policy towards an empathetic sociotechnical future.

Empathy is an often researched but highly ambiguous concept. This makes research on empathy prone to miscommunication and misinterpretation. Careful reflection on what is meant by empathy in a certain context is essential. As the scope of the variety of possible meanings of empathy one could encounter is vast, such reflection would benefit from a guide that maps out this terrain of conceptual confusion. To this end, the present study maps out the diversity of the meaning of empathy within the scope of autism research. The autism context is of particular relevance as autism is often linked to empathy in research, and crucially, how one understands empathy shapes theories of autism as well as the societal perception of autism. An interdisciplinary literature search was conducted to collect different conceptualizations of empathy used in autism research. In 111 articles, 31 unique definitions of empathy were used. This diversity can be accounted for by a list of 12 dimensions along which the meaning of empathy can diverge, found in this study. These dimensions pinpoint which aspects of empathy require attention and reflection when engaging with empathy in research. It can be used as a practical framework to reflect on empathy in the design and documentation of research, defending methodological decisions, and interpreting the work of others. Furthermore, this study discusses various, and some worrisome, implications for findings and theories in autism research.

Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.