Millimeter-wave self-backhauled small cells are a key component of next-generation wireless networks. Their dense deployment will increase data rates, reduce latency, and enable efficient data transport between the access and backhaul networks, providing greater flexibility not previously possible with optical fiber. Despite their high potential, operating dense self-backhauled networks optimally is an open challenge, particularly for radio resource management (RRM). This paper presents, RadiOrchestra, a holistic RRM framework that models and optimizes beamforming, rate selection as well as user association and admission control for self-backhauled networks. The framework is designed to account for practical challenges such as hardware limitations of base stations (e.g., computational capacity, discrete rates), the need for adaptability of backhaul links, and the presence of interference. Our framework is formulated as a nonconvex mixed-integer nonlinear program, which is challenging to solve. To approach this problem, we propose three algorithms that provide a trade-off between complexity and optimality. Furthermore, we derive upper and lower bounds to characterize the performance limits of the system. We evaluate the developed strategies in various scenarios, showing the feasibility of deploying practical self-backhauling in future networks.

The intrinsic hardware imperfection of WiFi chipsets manifests itself in the transmitted signal, leading to a unique radiometric (radio frequency) fingerprint. This fingerprint can be used as an additional means of authentication to enhance security. In this paper, we prove analytically and experimentally that these solutions are highly vulnerable to impersonation attacks. We also demonstrate that such a unique device-specific signature can be abused to track devices, thus violating privacy. We propose RF-Veil, a radiometric fingerprinting solution that is not only robust against impersonation attacks but also effective in protecting privacy by obfuscating the radiometric fingerprint of the transmitter for non-legitimate receivers. Specifically, we introduce a randomized pattern of phase errors to the transmitted signal such that only the intended receiver can extract the original fingerprint of the transmitter. In a series of experiments and analyses, we expose the vulnerability of adopting naive randomization to statistical attacks and introduce countermeasures. Finally, we show the efficacy of RF-Veil experimentally in protecting user privacy and enhancing security. More importantly, our proposed solution allows communicating with other devices, which do not employ RF-Veil.