E.A. Markatou
Please Note
5 records found
1
In today’s digital landscape, our interactions, from professional collaborations to personal data sharing involving photos, movies, and documents, have largely moved online. While transitioning these activities to digital platforms provides considerable convenience, it poses significant challenges in efficiently managing and securely erasing shared data in compliance with privacy regulations. Digital forgetting, particularly in co-owned data, transcends being merely desirable and becomes a mandate. Conventional data management paradigms, including cryptographic erasure techniques, typically apply uniform deletion across all stakeholders, neglecting audience-specific expiration and co-owner participation in deletion, which limits their applicability in contemporary cloud storage ecosystems. This article introduces a Policy-Based Conjunctive Scheme (PBCS) that enables conjunctive decision-making for data access and collaborative data forgetting, aligning with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’s Right to be Forgotten (RTBF). PBCS allows owners to upload their data to the cloud securely and offers policy-based access control to co-owners, granting them the ability to influence decisions about data deletion via democratic voting mechanisms significantly. The scheme leverages conjunctive access thresholds and mechanisms that gradually make data irretrievable. By integrating cryptographic primitives and Lagrange interpolation-based decay, PBCS supports a flexible, conjunctive governance model that upholds privacy and enhances the data lifecycle. We provide a formal analysis and an experimental evaluation of our scheme.
Reconstructing with Even Less
Amplifying Leakage and Drawing Graphs
Leakage-abuse attacks using access pattern leakage from range queries have been shown to reconstruct encrypted databases. However, prior work is either restricted to one-dimensional databases or requires access to all possible responses in two-dimensions. In this paper, we explore what an adversary can achieve with minimal leakage, focusing on denser databases, and present a leakage abuse attack from access pattern of range queries in multiple dimensions. Our attack employs a novel technique to systematically amplify access pattern leakage, inferring a large number of new query responses that have not been requested by the user. Letm be the size of the database domain. Our attack works on d-dimensional databases and achieves approximate reconstruction. For dense databases and a parameter 0 < ? < 1, our attack fully reconstructs an inner portion of size ?m of the database (referred to as the ?-core) after observing O(m logm) queries, uniformly at random. These are significant improvements over previous attacks that require the full set of responses, which has size O(m2). We are the first to leverage graph drawing techniques for database reconstruction attacks. We implement our attack and evaluate it with experiments on real-world databases, achieving accurate reconstructions after observing a small percentage of the responses.