This paper introduces an acceptance strategy based on reinforcement learning for automated bilateral negotiation, where negotiating agents bargain on multiple issues in a variety of negotiation scenarios. Several acceptance strategies based on predefined rules have been introduced in the automated negotiation literature. Those rules mostly rely on some heuristics, which take time and/or utility into account. For some negotiation settings, an acceptance strategy solely based on a negotiation deadline might perform well; however, it might fail in another setting. Instead of following predefined acceptance rules, this paper presents an acceptance strategy that aims to learn whether to accept its opponent's offer or make a counter offer by reinforcement signals received after performing an action. In an experimental setup, it is shown that the performance of the proposed approach improves over time.

This paper describes an agent-based, incentive-driven, and privacy-preserving information sharing framework. Main contribution of the paper is to give the data provider agent an active role in the information sharing process and to change the currently asymmetric position between the provider and the requester of data and information (DI) to the favor of the DI provider. Instead of a binary yes/no answer to the requester’s data request and the incentive offer, the provider may negotiate about excluding from the requested DI bundle certain pieces of DI with high privacy value, and/or ask for a different type of incentive. We show the presented approach on a use case. However, the proposed architecture is domain independent.