The governance of Digital Sequence Information (DSI) has become one of the most contested issues under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). While genetic resources have traditionally been governed through access and benefit-sharing (ABS) rules under the Nagoya Protocol, the rise of DSI has disrupted this framework. Disagreements persist over whether DSI should be treated as a global commons, openly accessible for research, or as a sovereign resource subject to national control. The 2024 Cali Fund represents a partial compromise, yet unresolved questions over contributions, allocation, and enforcement leave governance fragmented and fragile.

This thesis addresses these challenges by developing a hypergame model of DSI negotiations. Classical game theory explains stability under a shared strategic reality, but international negotiations often unfold under asymmetric perceptions: actors disagree not only on payoffs but also on the very game being played. The hypergame model formalises this divergence, enabling analysis of misperceptions, belief revision, and strategic surprise. Applied to DSI governance, the model evaluates how providers and users interact when they adopt different framings (DSI as commons or sovereign resource) and different international relations paradigms (liberalism or realism).