As part of its life cycle, malware can establish communication with its command and control server. To bypass static protection techniques, such as blocking certain IPs in firewalls or DNS server deny lists, malware can use algorithmically generated domains (AGD). Many different solutions based on deep learning have been proposed during the last years to detect this type of domains. However, there is a lack of ability to compare the proposed models because there is no common framework that allows experiments to be replicated under the same conditions. Each previous work shows its evaluation results, but under different experimentation conditions and even with different datasets. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing a software framework, dubbed Rampage (fRAMework to comPAre aGd dEtectors), focused on training and comparing machine learning models for AGD detection. Furthermore, we propose a new model that uses logistic regression and, using Rampage to obtain a fair comparison with different state-of-the-art models, achieves slightly better results than those obtained so far. In addition, the dataset built from real-world samples for evaluation, as well as the source code of Rampage, are also publicly released to facilitate its use and promote experimental reproducibility in this research field.

Algorithmically Generated Domains (AGDs) are integral to many modern malware campaigns, allowing adversaries to establish resilient command and control channels. While machine learning techniques are increasingly employed to detect AGDs, the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) in this domain remains largely underexplored. In this paper, we examine the ability of nine commercial LLMs to identify malicious AGDs, without parameter tuning or domain-specific training. We evaluate zero-shot approaches and few-shot learning approaches, using minimal labeled examples and diverse datasets with multiple prompt strategies. Our results show that certain LLMs can achieve detection accuracy between 77.3% and 89.3%. In a 10-shot classification setting, the largest models excel at distinguishing between malware families, particularly those employing hash-based generation schemes, underscoring the promise of LLMs for advanced threat detection. However, significant limitations arise when these models encounter real-world DNS traffic. Performance degradation on benign but structurally suspect domains highlights the risk of false positives in operational environments. This shortcoming has real-world consequences for security practitioners, given the need to avoid erroneous domain blocking that disrupt legitimate services. Our findings underscore the practicality of LLM-driven AGD detection, while emphasizing key areas where future research is needed (such as more robust warning design and model refinement) to ensure reliability in production environments.