In recent years, a number of evasion attacks for Industrial Control Systems have been proposed. During an evasion attack, the attacker attempts to hide ongoing process anomalies to avoid anomaly detection. Examples of such attacks range from replay attacks to adversarial machine learning techniques. Those attacks generally are applied to existing datasets with normal and anomalous data, to which the evasion attacks are added post-hoc. This represents a very strong attacker, who is effectively able to observe and manipulate data from anywhere in the system, in real-time, with zero processing delay, and no computational constraints. Prior work has shown that such strong attackers are theoretically difficult to detect by most existing countermeasures. So far, it is unclear if such an attack could be practically realized, and if there are challenges that would impair the attacker. In this work, we systematically discuss options for an attacker to mount evasion attacks in real-world ICS, and show the constraints that result from those options. To validate our findings, we design and implement a framework that allows the realization of evasion attacks and anomaly detection for ICS emulation. We demonstrate practical constraints that arise from different settings, and their effect on attack performance. For example, we found that network packet replay might trigger network errors, which will result in unexpected spoofing patterns. ... Read more

Recently, reconstruction-based anomaly detection was proposed as an effective technique to detect attacks in dynamic industrial control networks. Unlike classical network anomaly detectors that observe the network traffic, reconstruction-based detectors operate on the measured sensor data, leveraging physical process models learned a priori. In this work, we investigate different approaches to evade prior-work reconstruction-based anomaly detectors by manipulating sensor data so that the attack is concealed. We find that replay attacks (commonly assumed to be very strong) show bad performance (i.e., increasing the number of alarms) if the attacker is constrained to manipulate less than 95% of all features in the system, as hidden correlations between the features are not replicated well. To address this, we propose two novel attacks that manipulate a subset of the sensor readings, leveraging learned physical constraints of the system. Our attacks feature two different attacker models: A white box attacker, which uses an optimization approach with a detection oracle, and a black box attacker, which uses an autoencoder to translate anomalous data into normal data. We evaluate our implementation on two different datasets from the water distribution domain, showing that the detector's Recall drops from 0.68 to 0.12 by manipulating 4 sensors out of 82 in WADI dataset. In addition, we show that our black box attacks are transferable to different detectors: They work against autoencoder-, LSTM-, and CNN-based detectors. Finally, we implement and demonstrate our attacks on a real industrial testbed to demonstrate their feasibility in real-time. ... Read more