This thesis investigates the impact of increased value capture by a dominant platform sponsor on user behavior and platform ecosystem stability, focusing on YouTube in a single case experiment. This research aims to address the existing gap in understanding how users respond to this increase in ecosystems characterized by high switching costs. The literature review identified key concepts to build a theoretical framework. The experiment tested the direct effects of increased ad load on 79 participants by simulating a real-world YouTube experience and evaluating behavioral responses. The findings revealed that a higher ad load significantly increased user disengagement. However, the introduction of a premium subscription mitigated these effects to some extent, serving as a stabilizing mechanism. Notably, users willing to pay for premium exhibited aversion to ads independent of increased ad load. This study highlights the trade-offs platforms face between value capture and ecosystem sustainability. While ad monetization can drive short-term profits, excessive strategies risk destabilizing the ecosystem. Practical implications suggest sponsors must balance value capture with reinvestment strategies, focusing on user-centric improvements to maintain ecosystem health. Policymakers are urged to consider regulatory measures ensuring transparency and long-term user welfare in platform governance. The theoretical framework presented in this thesis can serve as a basis for future research in this field of platform research.

Information technology innovation has given worldwide access to each other, to information, and to entirely new digital platforms forming new markets over the last decade. Multi-sided digital platforms are platforms that mediate between different groups of users, both buyers and sellers.
With IT the multi-sided platforms are exploiting the economic phenomenon known as network externalities, increase the users, increase the value of the platform.
However, the cultural differences between countries can make or break a successful entry into another national market. Simply copying the monolithic algorithms has not been the answer, as recently admitted by Amazon's departure from China.
This project looked at seemingly similar cultures (the Netherlands and Germany) to identify if the macro-level cultural dimensions influenced the acceptance and use of multi-sided platforms. This was examined through a survey that assessed the acceptance and use of online food delivery platforms, a prime example of multi-sided platforms.
The cultures do have significant differences, but their impact on the acceptance and use of online food delivery platforms was non-significant. The acceptance of online food delivery platforms still followed a 10-year different diffusion, but the significant differences on macro-level cultural dimensions did not relate to this acceptance.
An interesting conclusion to this project is that the countries, expecting to have similar cultures, are significantly different and the data gathered proves to be more substantial than this project could investigate. The UTAUT2-model did
show a significant acceptance and use of online food delivery platforms, which shows that the online food delivery platform has successfully expanded cross-culturally in the case of the Netherlands and Germany.

This paper analyzes how specific aspects of design and governance of platform explain complementors participation in the video game console industry. This study introduces a new dimension to measure platform openness and suggest that by opening the platform vertically to different markets, platform firms can smoothen complementors competition and incentivize them to participate in their network. This study makes a first attempt to measure platform boundary resources and highlight its positive influence on complementors participation. Finally, the analysis also explores conditions under which signing an exclusive contract is beneficial for complementors. Complementors tend to participate in exclusive contracts during the early stages of platform rather than mature stages due to intense competition among complementors in the latter stage. The results suggest that by following the correct design and governance strategies, platform firms can orchestrate a large network of complementors and proliferate a variety of complementary product offerings.