Backdoors on Manifold Learning

Conference Paper (2024)
Author(s)

Christina Kreza (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

Stefanos Koffas (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

Behrad Tajalli (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

Mauro Conti (UniversitĂ  degli Studi di Padova, TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

Stjepan Picek (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)

Research Group
Cyber Security
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1145/3649403.3656484 Final published version
More Info
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Publication Year
2024
Language
English
Research Group
Cyber Security
Pages (from-to)
1-7
ISBN (electronic)
9798400706028
Event
2024 ACM Workshop on Wireless Security and Machine Learning, WiseML 2024, Seoul, Korea, Republic of
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144
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Abstract

Recently, attackers have targeted machine learning systems, introducing various attacks. The backdoor attack is popular in this field and is usually realized through data poisoning. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether the backdoor attacks remain effective when manifold learning algorithms are applied to the poisoned dataset. We conducted our experiments using two manifold learning techniques (Autoencoder and UMAP) on two benchmark datasets (MNIST and CIFAR10) and two backdoor strategies (clean and dirty label). We performed an array of experiments using different parameters, finding that we could reach an attack success rate of 95% and 75% even after reducing our data to two dimensions using Autoencoders and UMAP, respectively.