Target Selection for Tracking in Multifunction Radar Networks
Nash and Correlated Equilibria
N. Bogdanovic (TU Delft - Microwave Sensing, Signals & Systems)
H. Driessen (TU Delft - Microwave Sensing, Signals & Systems)
O. Yarovoy (TU Delft - Microwave Sensing, Signals & Systems)
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Abstract
We consider a target selection problem for multitarget tracking in a multifunction radar network from a gametheoretic perspective. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game. The radars are considered to be players in this game with utilities modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and their strategies are the observed targets whose number is known. Initially, for the problem of coordination, the Nash equilibria are characterized and, in order to find equilibria points, a distributed algorithm based on the bestresponse dynamics is proposed. Afterwards, the analysis is extended to the case of partial target observability and radar connectivity and heterogeneous interests among radars. The solution concept of correlated equilibria is employed and a distributed algorithm based on the regret-matching is proposed. The proposed algorithms are shown to perform well compared to the centralized approach of significantly higher complexity