Proof-of-Descendancy: Identity for Self-Replicating LLM Agents

Abstract

Self-replicating OpenClaw agents need decentralised identity and authorisation mechanisms that do not rely on centralised providers or registries. However, ordinary key ownership cannot show whether an agent is an authorised descendant of a trusted origin rather than a spoofed, cloned, or unauthorised instance. This thesis proposes a proof-of-descendancy framework that combines hierarchical deterministic key separation, parent-signed child certificates, Merkle-batched Bitcoin anchoring, revocation and capability checks, and IPv8/OpenClaw admission. Parent-signed child certificates provide the primary authorisation evidence, while Bitcoin anchoring supplies tamper-evident commitment evidence rather than authorisation by itself. A prototype evaluation with mock Bitcoin anchoring showed that valid lineage proofs were accepted, tested malformed and adversarial proofs were rejected, proof size and verification latency increased predictably with lineage depth, and lineage verification could influence OpenClaw admission decisions. The result is a unified lineage-aware identity and admission model for self-replicating agents, demonstrating feasibility within a prototype setting.