The long-distance European rail network under operator competition

A Transit Network Design and Frequency Setting problem approach

Master Thesis (2026)
Author(s)

S.B. Bichsel (TU Delft - Civil Engineering & Geosciences)

Contributor(s)

O. Cats – Mentor (TU Delft - Civil Engineering & Geosciences)

P.S.A. Stokkink – Mentor (TU Delft - Technology, Policy and Management)

Faculty
Civil Engineering & Geosciences
More Info
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Publication Year
2026
Language
English
Graduation Date
10-11-2026
Awarding Institution
Delft University of Technology
Project
3MARS
Programme
Transport, Infrastructure and Logistics
Faculty
Civil Engineering & Geosciences
Page Views
13
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Abstract

With increasing long-distance travel in the context of climate change, passenger rail transport is seen as a sustainable alternative to air and road travel due to its lower environmental externalities. To improve competitiveness and service quality, the European Commission introduced railway packages aimed at opening passenger rail markets to competition, removing entry barriers and reducing authorisation and certification costs. On-track competition already exists in countries such as Italy, the Czech Republic and Spain, and is expected to expand to markets such as Germany and the Channel Tunnel. These developments make it relevant to investigate how competition between operators shapes the European long-distance rail network.

Empirical studies generally find that competition increases service frequencies, lowers ticket prices and diversifies services, resulting in higher ridership. However, it can also reduce operator profitability, incentivise monopolisation or force incumbent operators to reduce services elsewhere to remain competitive on profitable lines, potentially resulting in a net welfare loss. Existing game-theoretic models investigate these effects on individual lines or small networks, while larger network planning methods, such as the Transit Network Design and Frequency Setting Problem (TNDFSP), predominantly adopt a central planner or single-operator perspective. This thesis addresses this gap by applying TNDFSP methodologies to a European network with multiple operators competing for passenger demand.

The main research question is: how does a decentralised European long-distance rail network perform under competition between service providers? To answer this, a customised TNDFSP methodology is developed and applied to a European rail network dataset. First, a pool of viable lines is generated using demand-weighted shortest-path methods. Subsequently, operators iteratively solve a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) to select lines and set daily frequencies, considering competitors' plans from the previous iteration and estimated demand per line. Elastic passenger demand is then assigned using a capacity-constrained probabilistic approach based on a multinomial logit route choice model. The process continues until the network stabilises, a maximum of 50 iterations is reached, or an ε-equilibrium is achieved, where operators' objective values change by less than ε = 1%.

The methodology is applied to a simplified European network of 123 cities and 256 edges, using network and demand data from Grolle et al. (2024). Five scenarios are tested. The baseline includes eleven national operators, required to maintain an initial

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