Outsourcing design: Beware of ‘division-of-cognition’. The case of Boeing's Dreamliner

Abstract

Design is increasingly seen as the key to solving all major (societal) problems and is used for this purpose on a multitude of topics. This poses a major danger if we fail to define the specific role of design within the whole of an innovation activity. We use the design of the development path of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner to make this role explicit and contextualize it within innovation. To this end, design will be embedded in a full-fledged innovation process that consists of four generic behaviors that range from initiating a process to develop something new to the realization of that new thing. This so-called IDER framework is used as a lens to discuss the consequences of Boeing's decision early this century. Boeing had decided to outsource the design, production and delivery of 70% of the airframe to 50 first-tier suppliers. This was in line with changes in supply and outsourcing at the time, but a drastic change for Boeing. The consequences of this design decision were dramatic: a time overrun of 80% and a budget overrun of approximately 400%. Boeing’s mistake was that they treated the new outsourcing strategy as a division of labor, while in essence this concerned a division of (design) cognition. By chosing for a transactional process of outsourcing, Boeing
overlooked a crucial internal relational process that has been present within the organization for decades: a collective design process that resulted in an integrated cognitive whole in the minds of 1000 or more Boeing employees that represents the new aircraft.