Congestion management in electricity distribution networks

Smart tariffs, local markets and direct control

Journal Article (2023)
Author(s)

R.J. Hennig (TU Delft - Technology, Policy and Management, TU Delft - Energy and Industry)

Laurens De Vries (TU Delft - Technology, Policy and Management, TU Delft - Energy and Industry)

Simon Tindemans (TU Delft - Intelligent Electrical Power Grids, TU Delft - Electrical Sustainable Energy)

Research Group
Intelligent Electrical Power Grids
Copyright
© 2023 R.J. Hennig, Laurens De Vries, Simon H. Tindemans
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2023.101660
More Info
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Publication Year
2023
Language
English
Copyright
© 2023 R.J. Hennig, Laurens De Vries, Simon H. Tindemans
Research Group
Intelligent Electrical Power Grids
Volume number
85
Reuse Rights

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Abstract

Increasing peaks from high-power loads such as EVs and heat pumps lead to congestion of electric distribution grids. The inherent flexibility of these loads could be used to resolve congestion events. Possible options for this are smart network tariffs, market-based approaches, and direct control of flexible loads by the network operator. In most instances, these approaches are looked at in isolation, without considering potential connections and trade-offs between them. In this contribution, we aim to bridge this gap by presenting an overarching design framework for congestion management mechanisms. We classify proposals based on design choices and qualitatively discuss their benefits and risks based on an extensive literature analysis. As there is no one-size-fits-all solution, we map possible risks and discuss the pros and cons of different mechanisms for various problem types. We caution against using market-based mechanisms for local congestion, as they can be susceptible to undesired strategic behavior of market actors.