Power of union

Federated honey password vaults against differential attack

Journal Article (2025)
Author(s)

Peng Xu (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

Tingting Rao (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

Wei Wang (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

Zhaojun Lu (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

K. Liang (TU Delft - Cyber Security)

Research Group
Cyber Security
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104592
More Info
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Publication Year
2025
Language
English
Research Group
Cyber Security
Bibliographical Note
Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository as part of the Taverne amendment. More information about this copyright law amendment can be found at https://www.openaccess.nl. Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public. @en
Volume number
157
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Abstract

The honey password vault is a promising method for managing user passwords and mitigating password-guessing attacks by creating plausible-looking decoy password vaults. Recently, various methods, such as Chatterjee-PCFG (IEEE S&P’15), Golla-Markov (ACM CCS’16), and Cheng-IUV (USENIX Security’21), have been proposed to construct the cornerstone of honey password vaults, known as the distribution transforming encoder (DTE). These innovations significantly enhance the security and functionality of each kind of DTE. However, our findings indicate that when users employ multiple honey password vaults of distinct DTEs to manage their passwords, a passive attacker can easily compromise user passwords by exploiting differences among those DTEs. Consequently, we propose the differential attack targeting existing honey password vaults. The extensive experimental results confirm the effectiveness of this attack, distinguishing real from decoy password vaults with accuracy from 99.13% to 100.00%. In response, we design a novel, collaborative approach to train DTE, called federated DTE model, and construct a secure honey password vault. This strategy markedly bolsters security, reducing the differential attack's distinguishing accuracy to approximately 52.41%, nearing the ideal threshold of 50.00%. Our findings emphasize the need for collaborative strategies to maintain password security to combat advanced cyber threats.

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