Current black-box backdoor attacks in convolutional neural networks formulate attack objective(s) as singleobjective optimization problems in single domain. Designing triggers in single domain harms semantics and trigger robustness as well as introduces visual and spectral anomaly. This work proposes a multi-objective black-box backdoor attack in dual domains via evolutionary algorithm (LADDER), the first instance of achieving multiple attack objectives simultaneously by optimizing triggers without requiring prior knowledge about victim model. In particular, we formulate LADDER as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOP) and solve it via multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA). MOEA maintains a population of triggers with trade-offs among attack objectives and uses non-dominated sort to drive triggers toward optimal solutions. We further apply preference-based selection to MOEA to exclude impractical triggers. LADDER investigates a new dualdomain perspective for trigger stealthiness by minimizing the anomaly between clean and poisoned samples in the spectral domain. Lastly, the robustness against preprocessing operations is achieved by pushing triggers to low-frequency regions. Extensive experiments comprehensively showcase that LADDER achieves attack effectiveness of at least 99%, attack robustness with 90.23% (50.09% higher than state-of-the-art attacks on average), superior natural stealthiness (1.12× to 196.74× improvement) and excellent spectral stealthiness (8.45× enhancement) as compared to current stealthy attacks by the average l2-norm across 5 public datasets.

Log anomaly detection aims to discover abnormal events from massive log data to ensure the security and reliability of software systems. However, due to the heterogeneity of log formats and syntaxes across different systems, existing log anomaly detection methods often need to be designed and trained for specific systems, lacking generalization ability. To address this challenge, we propose LogDLR, a novel unsupervised cross-system log anomaly detection method. The core idea of LogDLR is to use universal sentence embeddings and a Transformer-based autoencoder to extract domain-invariant latent representations from log entries, which can effectively adapt to log format changes and capture semantic information and dependencies in log sequences. To obtain domain-invariant latent representations, we adopt a domain-adversarial training strategy, introducing a domain discriminator that competes with the Transformer-based encoder through a gradient reversal layer, forcing the encoder to learn shared knowledge between different system logs. Finally, the Transformer-based decoder detects anomalies based on the domain-invariant representations obtained by the encoder. We evaluate LogDLR in simulated cross-system scenarios using three publicly available log datasets. The experimental results show that LogDLR can handle heterogeneous logs effectively in cross-system scenarios and achieve efficient and accurate anomaly detection on both source and target systems.

A t-out-of-n threshold ring signature allows t parties to jointly sign a message on behalf of n parties without revealing the identities of the signers. In this paper, we introduce a new generic construction for threshold ring signature, called GC-TRS, which can be built on top of a selection on identification schemes, commitment schemes, and a new primitive called t-out-of-n proof protocol which is a special type of zero-knowledge proof. In general, our design enables a group of t signers to first generate an aggregated signature by interacting with each other; then they are able to compute a t-out-of-n proof to convince the verifier that the aggregated signature is indeed produced by t individuals among a particular set. The signature is succinct, as it contains only one aggregated signature and one proof in the final signature. We define all the properties required for the building blocks to capture the security of the GC-TRS and provide a detailed security proof. Furthermore, we propose two lattice-based instantiations for the GC-TRS, named LTRS and CTRS, respectively. Notably, the CTRS scheme is the first scheme that has a logarithmic signature size relative to the ring size. Additionally, during the instantiation process, we construct two t-out-of-n proof protocols, which may be of independent interest.

The honey password vault is a promising method for managing user passwords and mitigating password-guessing attacks by creating plausible-looking decoy password vaults. Recently, various methods, such as Chatterjee-PCFG (IEEE S&P’15), Golla-Markov (ACM CCS’16), and Cheng-IUV (USENIX Security’21), have been proposed to construct the cornerstone of honey password vaults, known as the distribution transforming encoder (DTE). These innovations significantly enhance the security and functionality of each kind of DTE. However, our findings indicate that when users employ multiple honey password vaults of distinct DTEs to manage their passwords, a passive attacker can easily compromise user passwords by exploiting differences among those DTEs. Consequently, we propose the differential attack targeting existing honey password vaults. The extensive experimental results confirm the effectiveness of this attack, distinguishing real from decoy password vaults with accuracy from 99.13% to 100.00%. In response, we design a novel, collaborative approach to train DTE, called federated DTE model, and construct a secure honey password vault. This strategy markedly bolsters security, reducing the differential attack's distinguishing accuracy to approximately 52.41%, nearing the ideal threshold of 50.00%. Our findings emphasize the need for collaborative strategies to maintain password security to combat advanced cyber threats.

Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) aims to counter malicious clients and train an accurate global model while maintaining an extremely low attack success rate. Most existing systems, however, are only robust when most of the clients are honest. FLTrust (NDSS '21) and Zeno++ (ICML '20) do not make such an honest majority assumption but can only be applied to scenarios where the server is provided with an auxiliary dataset used to filter malicious updates. FLAME (USENIX '22) and EIFFeL (CCS '22) maintain the semi-honest majority assumption to guarantee robustness and the confidentiality of updates. It is, therefore, currently impossible to ensure Byzantine robustness and confidentiality of updates without assuming a semi-honest majority. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel Byzantine-robust and privacy-preserving FL system, called MUDGUARD, to capture malicious minority and majority for server and client sides, respectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that the accuracy of MUDGUARD is practically close to the FL baseline using FedAvg without attacks (≈0.8% gap on average). Meanwhile, the attack success rate is around 0%-5% even under an adaptive attack tailored to MUDGUARD. We further optimize our design by using binary secret sharing and polynomial transformation, leading to communication overhead and runtime decreases of 67%-89.17% and 66.05%-68.75%, respectively.

This paper introduces the Biometrics Data Space framework, which is a secure ecosystem built on Data Spaces technology and it is designed to address the challenges of suspect identification during cross-border crime investigation. Apart from Data Spaces technology, the proposed framework innovates by leveraging also Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and blockchain to enable secure, trustworthy, and sovereign data exchange between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) across borders. Specifically, it utilizes advanced PETs, including Large-Scale Biometric Data Indexing based on deep hashing techniques and Homomorphic Encryption to allow for suspect identification without disclosing sensitive information of personal biometric data. Thus, it enables LEAs to securely compare and exchange encrypted sensitive biometric data, including facial images, fingerprints and voiceprints, while maintaining data privacy and data sovereignty. LEAs define the usage rules for the biometic data they own and these rules are enforced to and respected by the other LEAs participating in the Biometrics Data Space. The proposed architecture is designed to be scalable, allowing the incorporation of additional biometric modalitiies and the easy expansion and integration with new participant LEAs.

Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) aims to counter malicious clients and train an accurate global model while maintaining an extremely low attack success rate. Most existing systems, however, are only robust when most of the clients are honest. FLTrust (NDSS '21) and Zeno++ (ICML '20) do not make such an honest majority assumption but can only be applied to scenarios where the server is provided with an auxiliary dataset used to filter malicious updates. FLAME (USENIX '22) and EIFFeL (CCS '22) maintain the semi-honest majority assumption to guarantee robustness and the confidentiality of updates. It is therefore currently impossible to ensure Byzantine robustness and confidentiality of updates without assuming a semi-honest majority. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel Byzantine-robust and privacy-preserving FL system, called MUDGUARD, to capture malicious minority and majority for server and client sides, respectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that the accuracy of MUDGUARD is practically close to the FL baseline using FedAvg without attacks (approximate 0.8% gap on average). Meanwhile, the attack success rate is around 0%-5% even under an adaptive attack tailored to MUDGUARD. We further optimize our design by using binary secret sharing and polynomial transformation leading to communication overhead and runtime decreases of 67%-89.17% and 66.05%-68.75%, respectively.

Searchable symmetric encryption has been vulnerable to inference attacks that rely on uniqueness in leakage patterns. However, many keywords in datasets lack distinctive leakage patterns, limiting the effectiveness of such attacks. The file injection attacks, initially proposed by Cash et al. (CCS 2015), have shown impressive performance with 100% accuracy and no prior knowledge requirement. Nevertheless, this attack fails to recover queries with underlying keywords not present in the injected files. To address these limitations, our research introduces a novel attack strategy called LEAP-Hierarchical Fusion Attack (LHFA) that combines the strengths of both file injection attacks and inference attacks. Before initiating keyword injection, we introduce a new approach for inert/active keyword selection. In the phase of selecting injected keywords, we focus on keywords without unique leakage patterns and recover them, leveraging their presence for document recovery. Our goal is to achieve an amplified effect in query recovery. We demonstrate a minimum query recovery rate of 1.3 queries per injected keyword with a 10% data leakage of a real-life dataset, and initiate further research to overcome challenges associated with non-distinctive keywords.

Dynamic Searchable Encryption (DSE) has emerged as a solution to efficiently handle and protect large-scale data storage in encrypted databases (EDBs). Volume leakage poses a significant threat, as it enables adversaries to reconstruct search queries and potentially compromise the security and privacy of data. Padding strategies are common countermeasures for the leakage, but they significantly increase storage and communication costs. In this work, we develop a new perspective on handling volume leakage. We start with distinct search and further explore a new concept called distinct DSE (d-DSE). We also define new security notions, in particular Distinct with Volume-Hiding security, as well as forward and backward privacy, for the new concept. Based on d-DSE, we construct the d-DSE designed EDB with related constructions for distinct keyword (d-KW-dDSE), keyword (KW-dDSE), and join queries (JOIN-dDSE) and update queries in encrypted databases. We instantiate a concrete scheme BF-SRE, employing Symmetric Revocable Encryption. We conduct extensive experiments on real-world datasets, such as Crime, Wikipedia, and Enron, for performance evaluation. The results demonstrate that our scheme is practical in data search and with comparable computational performance to the SOTA DSE scheme (MITRA*, AURA) and padding strategies (SEAL, ShieldDB). Furthermore, our proposal sharply reduces the communication cost as compared to padding strategies, with roughly 6.36 to 53.14x advantage for search queries.

Gordon et al. systematically studied the Universally Composable (UC) security of Multi-client Verifiable Computation (MVC), in which a set of computationally-weak clients delegate the computation of a general function to an untrusted server based on their private inputs, and proposed a UC-secure scheme ensuring that the protocol remains secure even when arbitrarily composed with other UC-secure instances. However, this scheme imposed a significant computational overhead on clients due to the utilization of fully homomorphic encryption, and the plaintext size scaled linearly with function input size. In this work, we present MVOC, a more efficient UC-secure MVC protocol, that significantly reduces the amortized overhead for clients in both semi-honest and malicious settings, by delegating a larger portion of the computation to the server. We enable clients to verify the garbled circuit before entering the online phase, ensuring security against malicious clients without incurring heavy overhead of compiling a semi-honest protocol into a malicious one. We present the detailed proof and analyze the theoretical complexity of MVOC. Furthermore, we implement our protocol and evaluate the performance, and the results demonstrate that the computation and communication overheads during the input phase can be decreased by at least 95.55% and 87.17%, respectively.

Federated Learning (FL) is a beneficial decentralized learning approach for preserving the privacy of local datasets of distributed agents. However, the distributed property of FL and untrustworthy data introducing the vulnerability to backdoor attacks. In this attack scenario, an adversary manipulates its local data with a specific trigger and trains a malicious local model to implant the backdoor. During inference, the global model would misbehave for any input with the trigger to the attacker-chosen prediction. Most existing backdoor attacks against FL focus on bypassing defense mechanisms, without considering the inspection of model parameters on the server. These attacks are susceptible to detection through dynamic clustering based on model parameter similarity. Besides, current methods provide limited imperceptibility of their trigger in the spatial domain. To address these limitations, we propose a stealthy backdoor attack called "Chironex"against FL with an imperceptible trigger in frequency space to deliver attack effectiveness, stealthiness and robustness against various countermeasures on FL. We first design a frequency trigger function to generate an imperceptible frequency trigger to evade human inspection. Then we fully exploit the attacker's advantage to enhance attack robustness by estimating benign updates and analyzing the impact of the backdoor on model parameters through a task-sensitive neuron searcher. It disguises malicious updates as benign ones by reducing the impact of backdoor neurons that greatly contribute to the backdoor task based on activation value, and encouraging them to update towards benign model parameters trained by the attacker. We conduct extensive experiments on various image classifiers with real-world datasets to provide empirical evidence that Chironex can evade the most recent robust FL aggregation algorithms, and further achieve a distinctly higher attack success rate than existing attacks, without undermining the utility of the global model.

Searchable symmetric encryption schemes often unintentionally disclose certain sensitive information, such as access, volume, and search patterns. Attackers can exploit such leakages and other available knowledge related to the user's database to recover queries. We find that the effectiveness of query recovery attacks depends on the volume/frequency distribution of keywords. Queries containing keywords with high volumes/frequencies are more susceptible to recovery, even when countermeasures are implemented. Attackers can also effectively leverage these “special” queries to recover all others. By exploiting the above finding, we propose a Jigsaw attack that begins by accurately identifying and recovering those distinctive queries. Leveraging the volume, frequency, and co-occurrence information, our attack achieves 90% accuracy in three tested datasets, which is comparable to previous attacks (Oya et al., USENIX' 22 and Damie et al., USENIX' 21). With the same runtime, our attack demonstrates an advantage over the attack proposed by Oya et al (approximately 15% more accuracy when the keyword universe size is 15k). Furthermore, our proposed attack outperforms existing attacks against widely studied countermeasures, achieving roughly 60% and 85% accuracy against the padding and the obfuscation, respectively. In this context, with a large keyword universe (≥3k), it surpasses current state-of-the-art attacks by more than 20%.

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model over vertically partitioned data without leaking private local information. Tree-based models, like XGBoost and LightGBM, have been widely used in VFL to enhance the interpretation and efficiency of training. However, there is a fundamental lack of research on how to conduct VFL securely over distributed labels. This work is the first to fill this gap by designing a novel protocol, called FEVERLESS, based on XGBoost. FEVERLESS leverages secure aggregation via information masking technique and global differential privacy provided by a fairly and randomly selected noise leader to prevent private information from being leaked in the training process. Furthermore, it provides label and data privacy against honest-but-curious adversaries even in the case of collusion of <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$n - 2$</tex-math></inline-formula> out of n clients. We present a comprehensive security and efficiency analysis for our design, and the empirical results from our experiments demonstrate that FEVERLESS is fast and secure. In particular, it outperforms the solution based on additive homomorphic encryption in runtime cost and provides better accuracy than the local differential privacy approach.

Modeling password distributions is a fundamental problem in password security, benefiting the research and applications on password guessing, password strength meters, honey password vaults, etc. As one of the best segment-based password models, WordPCFG has been proposed to capture individual semantic segments (called words) in passwords. However, we find WordPCFG does not address well the ambiguity of password segmentation by maximum matching, leading to the unreasonable segmentation of many password and further the inaccuracy of modeling password distributions. To address the ambiguity, we improve WordPCFG by maximum probability segmentation with A*-like pruning algorithm. The experimental results show that the improved WordPCFG cracks 99.26%–99.95% passwords, with nearly 5.67%–18.01% improvement.

Existing proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes to secure cloud data sharing raise challenges such as supporting the heterogeneous system efficiently and achieving the unbounded feature. To address this problem, we proposed a fast and secure unbounded cross-domain proxy re-encryption scheme, named FABRIC, which enables the delegator to authorize the semi-trusted cloud server to convert one ciphertext of an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to another ciphertext of an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme. As the first scheme to achieve the feature mentioned above, FABRIC not only enjoys constant computation overhead in the encryption, decryption, and re-encryption phases when the quantity of attributes increases, but is also unbounded such that the new attributes or roles could be adopted into the system anytime. Furthermore, FABRIC achieves adaptive security under the decisional linear assumption (DLIN). Eventually, detailed theoretical and experimental analysis proved that FABRIC enjoys excellent performance in efficiency and practicality in the cloud computing scenario.

This paper offers a prototype of a Hyperledger Fabric-IPFS based network architecture including a smart contract based encryption scheme that meant to improve the security of user’s data that is being uploaded to the distributed ledger. A new extension to the self-encryption scheme was deployed by integrating data owner’s identity into the encryption process. Such integration allows to permanently preserve ownership of the original file and link it to the person/entity who originally uploaded it. Moreover, self-encryption provides strong security guarantees that decryption of a file is computationally not feasible under the condition that the encrypted file and the key are safely stored.

Genotype imputation estimates missing genotypes from the haplotype or genotype reference panel in individual genetic sequences, which boosts the potential of genome-wide association and is essential in genetic data analysis. However, the genetic sequences involve people's privacy, confirming an individual's identification and even disease information. This work proposes a secure genotype imputation model, which uses a linear regression model and the homomorphic encryption scheme over ciphertext to impute missing genotypes. The inference model is trained with float plaintext parameters, which are round into integers to avoid high complexity homomorphic evaluation on float number operations without bootstrapping operations. Even though the rounding parameters in the inference model are not the same as those in the trained model, We find that it will no effect on the outcome of the homomorphic prediction. Thus, a high-efficiency genotype imputation inference model over the ciphertext is obtained while keeping the high-security level. The simulation results indicate that the accuracy of the secure inference model is almost the same as the original model trained on float parameters. The secure inference model's accuracy is 98.6% for a single genotype.

Traffic encrypted technology enables Internet users to protect their data secrecy, but it also brings a challenge to malicious package detection. To tackle this issue, researchers have investigated into encrypted traffic analysis (ETA) in recent years. Existing works, however, only focus on the accuracy of malicious flow identification. Using ETA as a technical black box, they pay little attention to the internal details and explanation of models. In this paper, we, for the first time, introduce interpretable machine learning into ETA. We aim to provide a reasonable explanation for detection results, so as to enable one to understand and further trust network security analysts. We develop a complete analysis framework, named DEV-ETA (detection, explanation and verification of ETA). DEV-ETA applies post hoc interpretation methods to explain the detection results and verify the explanation using the joint distribution of support features on the dataset. We run thorough experiments to explain the detection result using three popular explanation approaches, namely SHAP, LIME and MSS, and we verify the explanation via the feature distribution plot. The experimental results show that our design can interpret the detection result of ETA model instead of just simply treating the model as a black box.

Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables users to delegate the keyword search over dynamically updated encrypted databases to an honest-but-curious server without losing keyword privacy. This paper studies a new and practical security risk to DSSE, namely, secret key compromise (e.g., a user’s secret key is leaked or stolen), which threatens all the security guarantees offered by existing DSSE schemes. To address this open problem, we introduce the notion of searchable encryption with key-update (SEKU) that provides users with the option of non-interactive key updates. We further define the notion of post-compromise secure with respect to leakage functions to study whether DSSE schemes can still provide data security after the client’s secret key is compromised. We demonstrate that post-compromise security is achievable with a proposed protocol called “Bamboo”. Interestingly, the leakage functions of Bamboo satisfy the requirements for both forward and backward security. We conduct a performance evaluation of Bamboo using a real-world dataset and compare its runtime efficiency with the existing forward-and-backward secure DSSE schemes. The result shows that Bamboo provides strong security with better or comparable performance.