Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) aims to counter malicious clients and train an accurate global model while maintaining an extremely low attack success rate. Most existing systems, however, are only robust when most of the clients are honest. FLTrust (NDSS '21) and Zeno++ (ICML '20) do not make such an honest majority assumption but can only be applied to scenarios where the server is provided with an auxiliary dataset used to filter malicious updates. FLAME (USENIX '22) and EIFFeL (CCS '22) maintain the semi-honest majority assumption to guarantee robustness and the confidentiality of updates. It is, therefore, currently impossible to ensure Byzantine robustness and confidentiality of updates without assuming a semi-honest majority. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel Byzantine-robust and privacy-preserving FL system, called MUDGUARD, to capture malicious minority and majority for server and client sides, respectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that the accuracy of MUDGUARD is practically close to the FL baseline using FedAvg without attacks (≈0.8% gap on average). Meanwhile, the attack success rate is around 0%-5% even under an adaptive attack tailored to MUDGUARD. We further optimize our design by using binary secret sharing and polynomial transformation, leading to communication overhead and runtime decreases of 67%-89.17% and 66.05%-68.75%, respectively.

Big data is generated daily from diverse sources and devices, significantly transforming our lives through machine learning. However, it also presents major challenges, particularly for individuals and organizations with limited storage and computational resources. As a result, cloud services have gained increasing popularity over the past decades, enabling users to outsource storage and complex analysis tasks while focusing on data utilization. However, due to the potential curiosity of cloud servers and external attackers, directly uploading private data to the cloud is not a viable option. Instead, sensitive data must be encrypted before being outsourced.
This thesis investigates cryptographic solutions for secure and efficient cloud services, addressing key challenges in security, efficiency, and functionality. We focus on three core areas: updatable encryption (UE) to ensure long-termsecurity for stored data, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) for efficient computation over encrypted data, and searchable encryption (SE) to maintain search functionality over outsourced encrypted data....

Searchable symmetric encryption has been vulnerable to inference attacks that rely on uniqueness in leakage patterns. However, many keywords in datasets lack distinctive leakage patterns, limiting the effectiveness of such attacks. The file injection attacks, initially proposed by Cash et al. (CCS 2015), have shown impressive performance with 100% accuracy and no prior knowledge requirement. Nevertheless, this attack fails to recover queries with underlying keywords not present in the injected files. To address these limitations, our research introduces a novel attack strategy called LEAP-Hierarchical Fusion Attack (LHFA) that combines the strengths of both file injection attacks and inference attacks. Before initiating keyword injection, we introduce a new approach for inert/active keyword selection. In the phase of selecting injected keywords, we focus on keywords without unique leakage patterns and recover them, leveraging their presence for document recovery. Our goal is to achieve an amplified effect in query recovery. We demonstrate a minimum query recovery rate of 1.3 queries per injected keyword with a 10% data leakage of a real-life dataset, and initiate further research to overcome challenges associated with non-distinctive keywords.

Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (FL) aims to counter malicious clients and train an accurate global model while maintaining an extremely low attack success rate. Most existing systems, however, are only robust when most of the clients are honest. FLTrust (NDSS '21) and Zeno++ (ICML '20) do not make such an honest majority assumption but can only be applied to scenarios where the server is provided with an auxiliary dataset used to filter malicious updates. FLAME (USENIX '22) and EIFFeL (CCS '22) maintain the semi-honest majority assumption to guarantee robustness and the confidentiality of updates. It is therefore currently impossible to ensure Byzantine robustness and confidentiality of updates without assuming a semi-honest majority. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel Byzantine-robust and privacy-preserving FL system, called MUDGUARD, to capture malicious minority and majority for server and client sides, respectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that the accuracy of MUDGUARD is practically close to the FL baseline using FedAvg without attacks (approximate 0.8% gap on average). Meanwhile, the attack success rate is around 0%-5% even under an adaptive attack tailored to MUDGUARD. We further optimize our design by using binary secret sharing and polynomial transformation leading to communication overhead and runtime decreases of 67%-89.17% and 66.05%-68.75%, respectively.

Updatable encryption (UE) enables the cloud server to update the previously sourced encrypted data to a new key with only an update token received from the client. Two interesting works have been proposed to clarify the relationships among various UE security notions. Jiang (ASIACRYPT 2020) proved the equivalence of every security notion in the bi-directional and uni-directional key update settings and further, the security notion in the no-directional key update setting is strictly stronger than the above two. In contrast, Nishimaki (PKC 2022) proposed a new definition of uni-directional key update that is called the backward-leak uni-directional key update, and showed the equivalence relation by Jiang does not hold in this setting. We present a detailed comparison of every security notion in the four key update settings and prove that the security in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting is actually equivalent to that in the no-directional key update setting. Our result reduces the hard problem of constructing no-directional key update UE schemes to the construction of those with backward-leak uni-directional key updates.

Searchable Encryption schemes provide secure search over encrypted databases while allowing admitted information leakages. Generally, the leakages can be categorized into access and volume pattern. In most existing SE schemes, these leakages are caused by practical designs but are considered an acceptable price to achieve high search efficiency. Recent attacks have shown that such leakages could be easily exploited to retrieve the underlying keywords for search queries. Under the umbrella of attacking SE, we design a new Volume and Access Pattern Leakage-Abuse Attack (VAL-Attack) that improves the matching technique of LEAP (CCS ’21) and exploits both the access and volume patterns. Our proposed attack only leverages leaked documents and the keywords present in those documents as auxiliary knowledge and can effectively retrieve document and keyword matches from leaked data. Furthermore, the recovery performs without false positives. We further compare VAL-Attack with two recent well-defined attacks on several real-world datasets to highlight the effectiveness of our attack and present the performance under popular countermeasures.

Smart contracts on Ethereum enable billions of dollars to be transacted in a decentralized, transparent and trustless environment. However, adversaries lie await in the Dark Forest, waiting to exploit any and all smart contract vulnerabilities in order to extract profits from unsuspecting victims in this new financial system. As the blockchain space moves at a breakneck pace, exploits on smart contract vulnerabilities rapidly evolve, and existing research quickly becomes obsolete. It is imperative that smart contract developers stay up to date on the current most damaging vulnerabilities and countermeasures to ensure the security of users' funds, and to collectively ensure the future of Ethereum as a financial settlement layer. This research work focuses on two smart contract vulnerabilities: transaction-ordering dependency and oracle manipulation. Combined, these two vulnerabilities have been exploited to extract hundreds of millions of dollars from smart contracts in the past year (2020-2021). For each of them, this paper presents: (1) a literary survey from recent (as of 2021) formal and informal sources; (2) a reproducible experiment as code demonstrating the vulnerability and, where applicable, countermeasures to mitigate the vulnerability; and (3) analysis and discussion on proposed countermeasures. To conclude, strengths, weaknesses and trade-offs of these countermeasures are summarised, inspiring directions for future research.