Bin there, target that

Analyzing the target selection of IoT vulnerabilities in malware binaries

Conference Paper (2023)
Author(s)

Arwa Al Alsadi (TU Delft - Organisation & Governance)

Kaichi Sameshima (Yokohama National University)

Katsunari Yoshioka (Yokohama National University)

M.J.G. van Eeten (TU Delft - Organisation & Governance)

C. Hernandez Ganan (TU Delft - Organisation & Governance)

Research Group
Organisation & Governance
Copyright
© 2023 Arwa Al Alsadi, Kaichi Sameshima, Katsunari Yoshioka, M.J.G. van Eeten, C. Hernandez Ganan
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1145/3607199.3607241
More Info
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Publication Year
2023
Language
English
Copyright
© 2023 Arwa Al Alsadi, Kaichi Sameshima, Katsunari Yoshioka, M.J.G. van Eeten, C. Hernandez Ganan
Research Group
Organisation & Governance
Pages (from-to)
513-526
ISBN (electronic)
9798400707650
Reuse Rights

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Abstract

For years, attackers have exploited vulnerabilities in Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Previous research has examined target selection in cybercrime, but there has been little investigation into the factors that influence target selection in attacks on IoT. This study aims to better understand how attackers choose their targets by analyzing the frequency of specific exploits in 11,893 IoT malware binaries that were distributed between 2018-2021. Our findings indicate that 78% of these binary files did not specifically target IoT vulnerabilities but rather scanned the Internet for devices with weak authentication. To understand the usage of exploits in the remaining 2,629 binaries, we develop a theoretical model from relevant literature to examine the impact of four latent variables, i.e. exposure, vulnerability, exploitability, and patchability. We collect indicators to measure these variables and find that they can explain to a significant extent (?2=0.38) why some vulnerabilities are more frequently exploited than others. The severity of vulnerabilities does not significantly increase the frequency with which they are targeted, while the presence of Proof-of-Concept exploit code does increase it. We also observe that the availability of a patch reduces the frequency of being targeted, yet that more complex patches are associated with higher frequency. In terms of exposure, more widespread device models are more likely to be targeted by exploits. We end with recommendations to disincentivize attackers from targeting vulnerabilities.