M.J.G. van Eeten
Please Note
76 records found
1
We conducted a study to identify the risk perceptions of different stakeholder groups in the market by interviewing 20 representatives of Crypto-Asset Service Providers, Crypto-Asset Issuers, Institutional Investors, and Legal Experts. We then compared the risks deemed relevant by the stakeholder groups with the risks covered in the MiCA framework. That allowed us to identify which risks and stakeholder groups’ concerns are insufficiently covered by the current version of the MiCA framework. As a result, we show that Crypto-Asset Issuers’ risks are the least addressed in the current MiCA version. Specifically, residual risks remain with regard to smart contracts, oracles, and transactions. These risks should be considered for upcoming amendments to the regulation. ...
We conducted a study to identify the risk perceptions of different stakeholder groups in the market by interviewing 20 representatives of Crypto-Asset Service Providers, Crypto-Asset Issuers, Institutional Investors, and Legal Experts. We then compared the risks deemed relevant by the stakeholder groups with the risks covered in the MiCA framework. That allowed us to identify which risks and stakeholder groups’ concerns are insufficiently covered by the current version of the MiCA framework. As a result, we show that Crypto-Asset Issuers’ risks are the least addressed in the current MiCA version. Specifically, residual risks remain with regard to smart contracts, oracles, and transactions. These risks should be considered for upcoming amendments to the regulation.
“Tell Them They Are a Responsible Entity, Not a Customer”
Understanding Practitioner Challenges in Sector CSIRTs
Human and Organizational Factors in Smart Grid Cybersecurity
A Systematic Literature Review
Bits and Pieces
Piecing Together Factors of IoT Vulnerability Exploitation
"All Sorts of Other Reasons to Do It"
Explaining the Persistence of Sub-optimal IoT Security Advice
Money for Nothing, Supervision for a Fee
Investigating the Effects of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive on Cryptocurrency Exchanges in the Netherlands
By converting between currencies, cryptocurrency exchanges provide access between the traditional and cryptocurrency ecosystem, making them susceptible to money laundering. The European Union extended the scope of the 5 Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) to include cryptocurrency exchanges, requiring them to obtain a registration, conduct customer due diligence, and report unusual transactions. It is, however, unknown whether the measures introduced by the implementation of AMLD5 lead to less risk exposure and what impact it has on cryptocurrency exchanges. This paper uses a mixed-methods approach to explore the effects of the Dutch implementation of AMLD5 measures on cryptocurrency exchanges active in the Netherlands. We analyzed over 335,000 transactions and complemented them with seven qualitative interviews with Dutch cryptocurrency exchanges and the supervisory authority. We find that the Dutch implementation of AMLD5 imposed high administrative burdens and substantial fees on relatively small exchanges that do not pose high money laundering risks. This raises questions about the alignment of the goals and consequences of the regulation.
Understanding public acceptance of data collection by intelligence services in the Netherlands
A factorial survey experiment
Intelligence services must balance values such as national security and privacy when collecting data, with each scenario involving specific contextual trade-offs. While citizens benefit from effective intelligence operations, they also risk having their rights infringed upon. This makes citizen perspectives on acceptable data collection for intelligence and national security salient, as their legitimacy is also contingent upon public support. Yet, important aspects of citizen perspectives are understudied, such as the influence of contextual factors related to the use of intelligence collection methods. This study, inspired by Nissenbaum's contextual integrity framework, uses a factorial survey experiment with vignettes among a representative sample of 1423 Dutch citizens to examine the influence of threat type, duration, data subject, collection method, data type, and data retention on public acceptance of surveillance. Additionally, the study considers the impact of respondents' trust and privacy attitudes. The findings reveal significant influence of both contextual variables – particularly threat type, data subject, and data retention – and respondent predispositions – particularly trust in institutions, trust in intelligence services' competence, and privacy concerns for others. The findings imply that more in-depth contextual knowledge among the public may foster support for intelligence activities.
Carpet bombing-type DDoS attacks targeting a wide-range network rather than a single IP address have threatened the Internet. Some researchers have investigated the characteristics of single-target DDoS attacks. Still, much less is known about the characteristics of carpet bombing, even the differences between them. In this paper, we profile characteristics of carpet bombing via data from amplification DDoS honeypots and the differences between single-target DRDoS attacks and carpet bombing. We analyze attacks highly concentrated on a specific network on victims, duration, number of packets, ports, and TTLs, and describe the differences between single-target DRDoS attacks and carpet bombing. Our analysis at the level of Autonomous Systems demonstrates that carpet bombing attacks target more hosting networks, including some critical targets, than single-target attacks. We found carpet bombing attacks targeting more “Corporate” networks. We also found that each IP address targeted by carpet bombing receives fewer packets than single-target DRDoS attacks. According to the result of the comparison of attack duration and TTL, carpet bombing lasted longer and referred to having diverse values of TTL in the packets. On the contrary, most single-target DRDoS attacks have a single value of TTL in the packets. This implies carpet bombing has a higher probability of originating from multiple sources. Finally, comparing ports shows that using various ports for Carpet Bombing is highly proportional to single-target DRDoS attacks.
Finding Harmony in the Noise
Blending Security Alerts for Attack Detection
The Unpatchables
Why Municipalities Persist in Running Vulnerable Hosts
All detections were accurate. Our approach also uncovers a major misalignment between systems that the responsible CERT attributes to the municipalities and the systems the practitioners at municipalities believe they are responsible for. We then interviewed the professionals as to why these vulnerable systems were still exposed. We identify four explanations for non-patching: unaware, unable, retired and shut down. The institutional framework to mitigate cyber threats assumes that vulnerable systems are first correctly identified, then correctly attributed and notified, and finally correctly mitigated. Our findings illustrate that the first assumption is correct, the second one is not and the third one is more complicated in practice. We end with reflections on how to better remediate vulnerable hosts. ...
All detections were accurate. Our approach also uncovers a major misalignment between systems that the responsible CERT attributes to the municipalities and the systems the practitioners at municipalities believe they are responsible for. We then interviewed the professionals as to why these vulnerable systems were still exposed. We identify four explanations for non-patching: unaware, unable, retired and shut down. The institutional framework to mitigate cyber threats assumes that vulnerable systems are first correctly identified, then correctly attributed and notified, and finally correctly mitigated. Our findings illustrate that the first assumption is correct, the second one is not and the third one is more complicated in practice. We end with reflections on how to better remediate vulnerable hosts.
The AI Act represents a significant legislative effort by the European Union to govern the use of AI systems according to different risk-related classes, linking varying degrees of compliance obligations to the system's classification. However, it is often critiqued due to the lack of general public comprehension and effectiveness regarding the classification of AI systems to the corresponding risk classes. To mitigate those shortcomings, we propose a Decision-Tree-based framework aimed at increasing robustness, legal compliance and classification clarity with the Regulation. Quantitative evaluation shows that our framework is especially useful to individuals without a legal background, allowing them to improve considerably the accuracy and significantly reduce the time of case classification.
Bin there, target that
Analyzing the target selection of IoT vulnerabilities in malware binaries
No One Drinks From the Firehose
How Organizations Filter and Prioritize Vulnerability Information
The number of published software vulnerabilities is increasing every year. How do organizations stay in control of their attack surface despite their limited staff resources? Prior work has analyzed the overall software vulnerability ecosystem as well as patching processes within organizations, but not how these two are connected.We investigate this missing link through semi-structured interviews with 22 organizations in critical infrastructure and government services. We analyze where in these organizations the responsibility is allocated to collect and triage information about software vulnerabilities, and find that none of our respondents is acquiring such information comprehensively, not even in a reduced and aggregated form like the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). This means that information on known vulnerabilities will be missed, even in critical infrastructure organizations. We observe that organizations apply implicit and explicit coping mechanisms to reduce their intake of vulnerability information, and identify three trade-offs in these strategies: independence, pro-activeness and formalization.Although our respondents' behavior is in conflict with the widely accepted security advice to collect comprehensive vulnerability information about active systems, no respondents recall having experienced a security incident that was associated with missing information on a known software vulnerability. This suggests that, given scarce resources, reducing the intake of vulnerability information by up to 95% can be considered a rational strategy. Our findings raise questions about the allocation of responsibility and accountability for finding vulnerable systems, as well as suggest changing expectations around collecting vulnerability information.