Tsutomu Matsumoto
Please Note
7 records found
1
Carpet bombing-type DDoS attacks targeting a wide-range network rather than a single IP address have threatened the Internet. Some researchers have investigated the characteristics of single-target DDoS attacks. Still, much less is known about the characteristics of carpet bombing, even the differences between them. In this paper, we profile characteristics of carpet bombing via data from amplification DDoS honeypots and the differences between single-target DRDoS attacks and carpet bombing. We analyze attacks highly concentrated on a specific network on victims, duration, number of packets, ports, and TTLs, and describe the differences between single-target DRDoS attacks and carpet bombing. Our analysis at the level of Autonomous Systems demonstrates that carpet bombing attacks target more hosting networks, including some critical targets, than single-target attacks. We found carpet bombing attacks targeting more “Corporate” networks. We also found that each IP address targeted by carpet bombing receives fewer packets than single-target DRDoS attacks. According to the result of the comparison of attack duration and TTL, carpet bombing lasted longer and referred to having diverse values of TTL in the packets. On the contrary, most single-target DRDoS attacks have a single value of TTL in the packets. This implies carpet bombing has a higher probability of originating from multiple sources. Finally, comparing ports shows that using various ports for Carpet Bombing is highly proportional to single-target DRDoS attacks.
Disposable Botnets
Long-term Analysis of IoT Botnet Infrastructure
Pay the Piper
DDoS mitigation technique to deter financially-motivated attackers
Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the application layer (L7 DDoS) are among the most difficult attacks to defend against because they mimic normal user behavior. Some mitigation techniques against L7 DDoS, e.g., IP blacklisting and load balancing using a content delivery network, have been proposed; unfortunately, these are symptomatic treatments rather than fundamental solutions. In this paper, we propose a novel technique to disincentivize attackers from launching a DDoS attack by increasing attack costs. Assuming financially motivated attackers seeking to gain profit via DDoS attacks, their primary goal is to maximize revenue. On the basis of this assumption, we also propose a mitigation solution that requires mining cryptocurrencies to access servers. To perform a DDoS attack, attackers must mine cryptocurrency as a proof-of-work (PoW), and the victims then obtain a solution to the PoW. Thus, relative to attackers, the attack cost increases, and, in terms of victims, the economic damage is compensated by the value of the mined coins. On the basis of this model, we evaluate attacker strategies in a game theory manner and demonstrate that the proposed solution provides only negative economic benefits to attackers. Moreover, we implement a prototype to evaluate performance, and we show that this prototype demonstrates practical performance.
Disposable botnets
Examining the anatomy of IoT botnet infrastructure
While some of these honeypots probably have no operational relevance, e.g., they are student projects, this explanation does not fit the wider population. One cluster of honeypots was confirmed to belong to a well-known security center and was in use for ongoing attack monitoring. Concentrations in an another cluster appear to be the result of government incentives. We contacted 11 honeypot operators and received response from 4 operators, suggesting the problem of lack of network hygiene. Finally, we find that some honeypots are actively abused by attackers for hosting malicious binaries. We notified the owners of the detected honeypots via their network operators and provided recommendations for customization to avoid simple signature-based detection. We also shared our results with the honeypot developers. ...
While some of these honeypots probably have no operational relevance, e.g., they are student projects, this explanation does not fit the wider population. One cluster of honeypots was confirmed to belong to a well-known security center and was in use for ongoing attack monitoring. Concentrations in an another cluster appear to be the result of government incentives. We contacted 11 honeypot operators and received response from 4 operators, suggesting the problem of lack of network hygiene. Finally, we find that some honeypots are actively abused by attackers for hosting malicious binaries. We notified the owners of the detected honeypots via their network operators and provided recommendations for customization to avoid simple signature-based detection. We also shared our results with the honeypot developers.