J Constantino
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Accountable AI
It Takes Two to Tango
This Chapter argues that accountable artificial intelligence (AI) requires examining the role of humans in AI development and deployment. Hence, it discusses the importance of addressing the obligations of deployers and developers of AI systems to achieve accountable AI. The EU AI Act has implemented measures such as transparency or technical obligations to achieve such accountability. Similarly, it has implemented human oversight requirements outlined in Arts. 14 and 26 against high-risk AI systems. Some scholars and practitioners may argue that Art. 14 only applies to developers of AI systems. However, we understand that human oversight requirements govern both actors. Human oversight cannot be applied in isolation by requiring compliance of only one party. Otherwise, it would defeat the purpose of adding human control features to prevent AI systems from harming fundamental rights. Based on this perspective, we propose that (at least) two actors are required to make accountable AI more tangible. Nonetheless, we are conscious that this legislation is in its infancy, and only time will tell how human oversight obligations (Arts. 14 and 26) are to be applied – whether in isolation or in conjunction.
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This Chapter argues that accountable artificial intelligence (AI) requires examining the role of humans in AI development and deployment. Hence, it discusses the importance of addressing the obligations of deployers and developers of AI systems to achieve accountable AI. The EU AI Act has implemented measures such as transparency or technical obligations to achieve such accountability. Similarly, it has implemented human oversight requirements outlined in Arts. 14 and 26 against high-risk AI systems. Some scholars and practitioners may argue that Art. 14 only applies to developers of AI systems. However, we understand that human oversight requirements govern both actors. Human oversight cannot be applied in isolation by requiring compliance of only one party. Otherwise, it would defeat the purpose of adding human control features to prevent AI systems from harming fundamental rights. Based on this perspective, we propose that (at least) two actors are required to make accountable AI more tangible. Nonetheless, we are conscious that this legislation is in its infancy, and only time will tell how human oversight obligations (Arts. 14 and 26) are to be applied – whether in isolation or in conjunction.
The AI Act brands itself as the first-ever legislation that uniformly regulates the use of AI systems in European society across all sectors. However, this branding from the AI Act appears not to be one hundred per cent accurate. Rather, the AI Act has brought exemptions to its ‘uniformed’ rules on the use of AI systems in the European Union. This chapter analyses the exemptions of certain AI systems from the EU AI Act, particularly focusing on national security, military, international cooperation, research, and personal use, and discusses the implications for fundamental rights and legal accountability.
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The AI Act brands itself as the first-ever legislation that uniformly regulates the use of AI systems in European society across all sectors. However, this branding from the AI Act appears not to be one hundred per cent accurate. Rather, the AI Act has brought exemptions to its ‘uniformed’ rules on the use of AI systems in the European Union. This chapter analyses the exemptions of certain AI systems from the EU AI Act, particularly focusing on national security, military, international cooperation, research, and personal use, and discusses the implications for fundamental rights and legal accountability.
Article 15 of the AI Act seeks to contribute to the trustworthiness of AI systems. According to Article 15, trustworthiness means requiring the developing and deployment of AI systems that contain features such as accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. For instance, focusing on protecting the data and privacy of citizens against cyberattacks or developing AI systems with accurate data to promote non-harmful outputs. Arguably, the requirements of ‘trustworthy AI’ through the principles outlined in Article 15 of the AI Act can lead to closing accountability gaps and opening legal opportunities to contest the liability of developers and deployers of AI systems.
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Article 15 of the AI Act seeks to contribute to the trustworthiness of AI systems. According to Article 15, trustworthiness means requiring the developing and deployment of AI systems that contain features such as accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. For instance, focusing on protecting the data and privacy of citizens against cyberattacks or developing AI systems with accurate data to promote non-harmful outputs. Arguably, the requirements of ‘trustworthy AI’ through the principles outlined in Article 15 of the AI Act can lead to closing accountability gaps and opening legal opportunities to contest the liability of developers and deployers of AI systems.
To Know What You Do Not Know
Challenges for Explainable AI for Security and Threat Intelligence
Book chapter
(2024)
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Sarah van Gerwen, J.E. Constantino Torres, Ritten Roothaert, Brecht Weerheijm, Ben Wagner, Gregor Pavlin, Bram Klievink, Stefan Schlobach, Katja Tuma, Fabio Massacci
Human analysts working for threat intelligence leverage tools powered by artificial intelligence to routinely assemble actionable intelligence. Yet, threat intelligence sources and methods often have significant uncertainties and biases. In addition, data sharing might be limited for operational, strategic, or legal reasons. Experts are aware of these limitations but lack formal means to represent and quantify these uncertainties in their daily work. In this chapter, we enunciate the technical, legal, and societal challenges for building explainable AI for threat intelligence. We also discuss ideas for overcoming these challenges.
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Human analysts working for threat intelligence leverage tools powered by artificial intelligence to routinely assemble actionable intelligence. Yet, threat intelligence sources and methods often have significant uncertainties and biases. In addition, data sharing might be limited for operational, strategic, or legal reasons. Experts are aware of these limitations but lack formal means to represent and quantify these uncertainties in their daily work. In this chapter, we enunciate the technical, legal, and societal challenges for building explainable AI for threat intelligence. We also discuss ideas for overcoming these challenges.
Journal article
(2024)
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Hilmy Hanif, J.E. Constantino Torres, M.T. Sekwenz, M.J.G. van Eeten, J. Ubacht, Ben Wagner, Y. Zhauniarovich
The AI Act represents a significant legislative effort by the European Union to govern the use of AI systems according to different risk-related classes, imposing different degrees of compliance obligations to users and providers of AI systems. However, it is often critiqued due to the lack of general public comprehension and effectiveness regarding the classification of AI systems to the corresponding risk classes. To mitigate these shortcomings, we propose a Decision-Tree-based framework aimed at increasing legal compliance and classification clarity. By performing a quantitative evaluation, we show that our framework is especially beneficial to individuals without a legal background, allowing them to enhance the accuracy and speed of AI system classification according to the AI Act. The qualitative study results show that the framework is helpful to all participants, allowing them to justify intuitively made decisions and making the classification process clearer.
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The AI Act represents a significant legislative effort by the European Union to govern the use of AI systems according to different risk-related classes, imposing different degrees of compliance obligations to users and providers of AI systems. However, it is often critiqued due to the lack of general public comprehension and effectiveness regarding the classification of AI systems to the corresponding risk classes. To mitigate these shortcomings, we propose a Decision-Tree-based framework aimed at increasing legal compliance and classification clarity. By performing a quantitative evaluation, we show that our framework is especially beneficial to individuals without a legal background, allowing them to enhance the accuracy and speed of AI system classification according to the AI Act. The qualitative study results show that the framework is helpful to all participants, allowing them to justify intuitively made decisions and making the classification process clearer.
Accountability is considered a cornerstone of public administration and good governance. This study characterizes the relationship between the Dutch Intelligence and Secret Service (“AIVD”) and citizens (represented by parliament, courts, and oversight boards) as a complex actor-forum relationship. We utilize different accountability principles of public administration found in international and Dutch instruments and academic literature to propose workable principles of accountability for the AIVD. These proposed principles of accountability can be summarized as acting within duty, explainability, necessity, proportionality, reporting and record keeping, redress, and continuous independent oversight. Similarly, there are some conditions to support the workability of accountability principles. These conditions may be characterized as productive actor-forum relationships, cooperation, flexibility, value alignment, and learning and improving opportunities.
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Accountability is considered a cornerstone of public administration and good governance. This study characterizes the relationship between the Dutch Intelligence and Secret Service (“AIVD”) and citizens (represented by parliament, courts, and oversight boards) as a complex actor-forum relationship. We utilize different accountability principles of public administration found in international and Dutch instruments and academic literature to propose workable principles of accountability for the AIVD. These proposed principles of accountability can be summarized as acting within duty, explainability, necessity, proportionality, reporting and record keeping, redress, and continuous independent oversight. Similarly, there are some conditions to support the workability of accountability principles. These conditions may be characterized as productive actor-forum relationships, cooperation, flexibility, value alignment, and learning and improving opportunities.
Conference paper
(2023)
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Hilmy Hanif, Jorge Constantino, Marie Therese Sekwenz, Michel Van Eeten, Jolien Ubacht, Ben Wagner, Yury Zhauniarovich
The AI Act represents a significant legislative effort by the European Union to govern the use of AI systems according to different risk-related classes, linking varying degrees of compliance obligations to the system's classification. However, it is often critiqued due to the lack of general public comprehension and effectiveness regarding the classification of AI systems to the corresponding risk classes. To mitigate those shortcomings, we propose a Decision-Tree-based framework aimed at increasing robustness, legal compliance and classification clarity with the Regulation. Quantitative evaluation shows that our framework is especially useful to individuals without a legal background, allowing them to improve considerably the accuracy and significantly reduce the time of case classification.
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The AI Act represents a significant legislative effort by the European Union to govern the use of AI systems according to different risk-related classes, linking varying degrees of compliance obligations to the system's classification. However, it is often critiqued due to the lack of general public comprehension and effectiveness regarding the classification of AI systems to the corresponding risk classes. To mitigate those shortcomings, we propose a Decision-Tree-based framework aimed at increasing robustness, legal compliance and classification clarity with the Regulation. Quantitative evaluation shows that our framework is especially useful to individuals without a legal background, allowing them to improve considerably the accuracy and significantly reduce the time of case classification.
Exploring article 14 of the EU AI proposal
Human in the loop challenges when overseeing high-risk ai systems in public service organisations
The European Commission has given emphasis to a human-centric approach to allow the deployment of “safe” Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in our society. However, Article 14 (human oversight obligations) of the EU AI Act Proposal provides little emphasis on human overseers’ responsibilities when tasked to perform meaningful human oversight. This paper tests Article 14 against different challenges of public service organisations such as police departments (street-level bureaucracies) and argues why Article 14 may not be a success in street-level bureaucracies, which could ultimately harm fundamental rights.
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The European Commission has given emphasis to a human-centric approach to allow the deployment of “safe” Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in our society. However, Article 14 (human oversight obligations) of the EU AI Act Proposal provides little emphasis on human overseers’ responsibilities when tasked to perform meaningful human oversight. This paper tests Article 14 against different challenges of public service organisations such as police departments (street-level bureaucracies) and argues why Article 14 may not be a success in street-level bureaucracies, which could ultimately harm fundamental rights.