How truthful explanation of a conceder negotiation agent affects human trust, compared to a neutral one
P. Germanov (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)
C. Centeio Jorge – Mentor (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence)
Myrthe L. Tielman – Mentor (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence)
R. Bidarra – Graduation committee member (TU Delft - Computer Graphics and Visualisation)
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Abstract
Trust in negotiation agents plays a crucial role in their adoption and utilization. However, there is not enough research on what factors influence it. This paper aims to investigate how different explanations of a negotiation agent’s strategy affect human trust and decision-making. Specifically, it compares the effects of a truthful explanation and a neutral explanation on trust in a conceder negotiation agent. An experiment was conducted involving human participants interacting with a negotiation agent in an imaginary negotiation scenario. The participants were divided into two groups, with one group receiving a truthful explanation of the agent’s strategy, and the other receiving a neutral explanation. Trust levels were assessed through a questionnaire and the results were analyzed using an independent samples t test. No significant difference was found between the two groups, but further research needs to be done before conclusions are drawn.