In defense of reliabilist epistemology of algorithms

Journal Article (2025)
Author(s)

Juan M. Duran (TU Delft - Ethics & Philosophy of Technology)

Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00664-2
More Info
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Publication Year
2025
Language
English
Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
Issue number
2
Volume number
15
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Abstract

In a reliabilist epistemology of algorithms, a high frequency of accurate output representations is indicative of the algorithm’s reliability. Recently, Humphreys challenged this assumption, arguing that reliability depends not only on frequency but also on the quality of outputs. Specifically, he contends that radical and egregious misrepresentations have a distinct epistemic impact on our assessment of an algorithm’s reliability, regardless of the frequency of their occurrence. He terms these statistically insignificant but serious errors (SIS-Errors) and maintains that their occurrence warrants revoking our epistemic attitude towards the algorithm’s reliability. This article seeks to defend reliabilist epistemologies of algorithms against the challenge posed by SIS-Errors. To this end, I draw upon computational reliabilism as a foundational framework and articulate epistemological conditions designed to prevent SIS-Errors and thus preserve algorithmic reliability.