Making it problematic

Abstract

This paper notes two problems in Brandom's approach to communicative understanding. Together, they undermine the rational and the pragmatic credentials of his project. Logic can supply the 'oughts' when it comes to theoretical reason. The content of belief b can entail belief c so that if I believe b I ought to believe c. This sort of transition points to a very basic test of rationality. Irrationality, for example, could be indicated by believing b, which implies c, but not believing c. In practice, through Brandom's scorekeeping, modal reconstructions of linguistic behaviour reveal implicit structures akin to these theoretical, logical structures. Moreover, in being a pragmatist, Brandom hopes to account for materially construed inferences - conceptual content comes from practice, not semantic analysis. However, in Brandom's approach lie two problems, one rational and one pragmatic, which create an issue for the coherence of his scorekeeping approach.