What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

Journal Article (2023)
Author(s)

James Hutton (TU Delft - Ethics & Philosophy of Technology)

Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
Copyright
© 2023 James Hutton
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060106
More Info
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Publication Year
2023
Language
English
Copyright
© 2023 James Hutton
Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
Issue number
6
Volume number
8
Pages (from-to)
1-10
Reuse Rights

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Abstract

Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape.