In this report, we present a framework for mapping the ethical dilemmas that arise in the development of offshore wind parks in the North Sea. The development of new technologies, such as offshore wind parks, gives rise to ethical dilemmas. These dilemmas can be characterised in terms of conflicts between relevant values, which we identified through a review of the literature on the ethics of technology and through consultation with stakeholders. With the input of stakeholders, these values have then been systematically categorised so they can be interpreted in terms of ethical dilemmas. Our analysis of the input from the stakeholder workshop reveals a deep concern for balancing the Dutch energy transition with the ecological preservation of the North Sea and its ecosystems. When identifying values, stakeholders noted that it is important that the energy transition is not considered in isolation from other pressures on the North Sea. This includes other significant energy-related developments, such as gas exploration and deep-sea mining in the North Sea. Stakeholders observed that the current EU regulations are not adequately addressing these cumulative pressures caused by wind farms, other activities in the North Sea, and the impact of climate change. Therefore, stakeholders believe that EU-level and Dutch-level regulations should reflect these complexities in a more ethically informed manner. Our reflections also highlight the need for adaptive policies and institutions that would better reflect the complexities of cumulative pressures on the North Sea in a more ethically informed manner, accounting for evolving knowledge and values; the moral responsibilities not only of the Netherlands but also of other countries impacting the North Sea; and the long-term sustainability of energy infrastructure development. At its core, the output of the stakeholder workshop is not limited to the exploration of offshore wind energy but expands to questioning how to ensure that the Dutch energy transition contributes to climate goals without disproportionately harming the North Sea or creating new, unforeseen environmental and societal challenges. In other words, based on our analysis of the insights from the workshop, we can confirm that the question is broader than environmental concerns regarding, for instance, bird mortality. The executed study shows the necessity of understanding the relations between spatial, temporal, and environmental challenges. From this perspective, ethical issues exceed an isolated focus on the ecological impacts of offshore wind energy to signify the importance of ethical scrutiny of cumulative and interrelated effects of Dutch energy transition development on the North Sea. Our recommendations expand on a proposed integrated values-oriented research agenda for the Dutch energy transition. ... Read more

How is ethical knowledge possible? One promising answer is Moral Empiricism: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experiences. But Moral Empiricism faces a serious problem. Our emotions are unreliable guides to ethics, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects, so the habit of basing ethical beliefs on one's emotions seems too unreliable to yield knowledge. I develop a new, virtue-epistemic solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical decision-making. By exploiting a frequently overlooked connection between reliability and defeaters, I argue that an agent can have a reliable belief-forming habit despite having unreliable emotions. The upshot is that emotion-based ethical knowledge is possible even for people whose emotions are unreliable, but only if we cultivate the skill of noticing and responding to signs that a given emotion is unfitting. ... Read more

This article provides a new account of how moral beliefs can be epistemically justified. I argue that we should take seriously the hypothesis that the human mind contains emotion-enriched moral perceptions, i.e. perceptual experiences as of moral properties, arising from cognitive penetration by emotions. Further, I argue that if this hypothesis is true, then such perceptual experiences can provide regress-stopping justification for moral beliefs. Emotion-enriched moral perceptions do exhibit a kind of epistemic dependence: they can only justify moral beliefs if the emotions from which they arise are themselves justified. However, to have a justified emotion, one only needs (1) to possess some non-moral information and (2) to respond fittingly to this information. Neither (1) nor (2) requires one to possess any justification for moral beliefs antecedently, so emotion-enriched moral perceptions can halt the regress of moral justification. ... Read more

Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape. ... Read more

One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. ... Read more

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. It remains disputed what this conclusion amounts to. Does Kant argue only for the Weak Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing interpretations have assumed that, by Kant’s lights, there is a substantive difference between the two. I argue that this is false. Kant holds that the concept of cause contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate according to universal laws. He is explicit about this commitment, not least in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III. Consequently, Kant’s move from causal rules to universal laws is much simpler than previously assumed. Given his commitments, establishing the Strong Causal Principle requires no more argument than establishing the Weak Causal Principle. ... Read more

Kant holds that some nonhuman animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite lacking conceptual capacities (“understanding”). What does this tell us about his theory of human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, for Kant, (i) humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally structured in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and (ii) such representations are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must take. ... Read more

In the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind. ... Read more