Kant, causation and laws of nature

Journal Article (2021)
Author(s)

James Hutton (Pembroke College)

Affiliation
External organisation
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.01.003
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Publication Year
2021
Language
English
Affiliation
External organisation
Volume number
86
Pages (from-to)
93-102

Abstract

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. It remains disputed what this conclusion amounts to. Does Kant argue only for the Weak Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing interpretations have assumed that, by Kant’s lights, there is a substantive difference between the two. I argue that this is false. Kant holds that the concept of cause contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate according to universal laws. He is explicit about this commitment, not least in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III. Consequently, Kant’s move from causal rules to universal laws is much simpler than previously assumed. Given his commitments, establishing the Strong Causal Principle requires no more argument than establishing the Weak Causal Principle.

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