A secure control framework for self-triggered control

Abstract

This thesis addresses the detection and prevention of adversarial attacks on self-triggered control (STC) systems and demonstrates how manipulating the sampling times can be used to provide a secure control framework. Secure control is vital to guarantee both the safety and security of critical infrastructure, which has been the target of malicious attacks over the past decade.

First, a novel watermarking scheme is proposed based on the early triggering of a well-designed STC policy, such that stability is guaranteed to be preserved. We show that this watermarking scheme, together with an event-triggered χ² detector we design, is able to detect replay attacks. An online heuristic for obtaining an optimal early triggering policy is provided. If certain assumptions hold we show that the early triggering policy is a discrete uniform one. Through an illustrative example, both a quantitative and qualitative comparison between two other watermarking schemes are provided. We conclude that none of the watermarking schemes can claim absolute superiority, and trade-offs between all considered schemes exist.

Next, we propose a new type of attack called a switched zero dynamic attack (ZDA), and provide an algorithm on how to construct these switched ZDA. We show that certain STC systems are susceptible to such attacks, and demonstrate that by tuning the triggering parameters there exist sufficient conditions such that these attacks are no longer disruptive. The effect of additive perturbations and a non-zero initial condition, as well as the proposed tuning method, are shown in a numerical example. We provide a qualitative comparison between several other countermeasures in the literature, which we extend for aperiodic sampling when needed. Finally, shortcomings and future directions are discussed.