Optimal nonlinear solutions for reverse Stackelberg games with incomplete information

Conference paper (2016)

Authors

Z. Su Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
S. Baldi Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
B.H.K. De Schutter Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
Research Group
Team Bart De Schutter (Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering) (TU Delft)
Optimization Programming Games Decision making Standards Indexes Systematics
More Info
expand_more

Published Date

2016

Language

English

Reuse Rights

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Faculty

Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering

Department

Delft Center for Systems and Control

Research Group

Team Bart De Schutter

Abstract

The reverse Stackelberg game provides a suitable decision-making framework for hierarchical control problems like network pricing and toll design. We propose a novel numerical solution approach for systematic computation of optimal nonlinear leader functions, also known as incentives, for reverse Stackelberg games with incomplete information and general, nonconcave utility functions. In particular, we apply basis function approximation to the class of nonlinear leader functions, and treat the incentive design problem as a standard semi-infinite programming problem. A worked example is provided to illustrate the proposed solution approach and to demonstrate its efficiency.