Library
local_library Home Repository

Boolean Negotiation Games

Conference Paper (2016)
Author(s)

Nils Bulling (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence)

Koen Hindriks (TU Delft - Interactive Intelligence)

Research Group
Interactive Intelligence
Copyright
© 2016 N. Bulling, K.V. Hindriks
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1748
More Info
expand_more
Publication Year
2016
Language
English
Copyright
© 2016 N. Bulling, K.V. Hindriks
Research Group
Interactive Intelligence
Pages (from-to)
1748-1749
ISBN (print)
978-1-61499-671-2
ISBN (electronic)
978-1-61499-672-9
Reuse Rights

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Abstract

We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game.