Library
Repository Home account_circle Login

Boolean Negotiation Games

Conference Paper (2016)
Author(s)

Nils Bulling (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

Koen V. Hindriks (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)

Research Group
Interactive Intelligence
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1748 Final published version
More Info
expand_more
Publication Year
2016
Language
English
Research Group
Interactive Intelligence
Pages (from-to)
1748-1749
ISBN (print)
978-1-61499-671-2
ISBN (electronic)
978-1-61499-672-9
Event
ECAI 2016 (2016-08-29 - 2016-09-02), World Forum, The Hague, Netherlands
Downloads counter
247
Collections
Institutional Repository
Reuse Rights

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Abstract

We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game.