Conceptual design of the Guard Lock for Strandeiland Flood Defence

Abstract

In response to Amsterdam’s housing shortage, IJburg on the east side of Amsterdam, is being devel- oped. IJburg consists of six artificial islands in total on which about 20,000 homes for 50,000 residents are being built. Strandeiland (Beach island in English), located in the lake called IJmeer, is one of these artificial islands which is currently being developed to accommodate approximately 20,000 residents. This project aims to introduce approximately 8,000 homes. However, the establishment of Strandei- land presents hydraulic safety concerns, especially with the presence of extreme low water levels and fluctuations due to wind set-up and set-down.
Strandeiland will feature an inland water with high recreational value for residents. This inland water will also provide access for recreational boating. Wind set-down and set-up can create extreme water level differences in this inner water. These water level differences are unfavorable and create danger to the stability of the island. These fluctuations pose a severe challenge to the stability and functionality of the island’s water infrastructure. Two primary solutions were evaluated: the adaptation of the inner quay wall or the implementation of a guard lock. Making the inner quay wall suitable for the water level differences brings several implications:
• Restrictions on utilities: Because the inner quay wall would be marked as primary flood defence, no pipes and cables would be allowed inside the wall.
• Design constraints: When the quay wall serves as the primary flood defence, construction on its inner slope and tree planting is prohibited. This would negatively impact the aesthetics of the waterfront and limit the housing construction space.
• Increased height requirements: The inner wall has to be higher according to primary flood defence regulations, this would escalate construction costs.
• Higher strength sheet piles: A higher strength of sheet piles has to be used to withstand ex- tremely low water levels which would also lead to escalating construction costs.
Adapting the Inner Quay Wall, while feasible, introduces significant design and functional constraints. Because of these constraints, this option is less desirable and implementing a guard lock is the favor- able solution to solve the water level fluctuations.
The guard lock as part of the primary flood defence controls extreme water level variations, ensuring Strandeiland’s water infrastructure’s integrity. The Guard Lock not only modifies the primary flood de- fence location, reducing its length considerably but also mitigates the constraints associated with an adapted inner quay wall. The water level spread is set from the program of requirements at NAP -0.6 meters and NAP +0.1. The current estimate is that this will require the lock to close 10 times a year, which is considered acceptable. A movable bridge is integrated which functions both as a neighbor- hood connector and a part of the beachside boulevard.
The main objective during the design phase is to develop a Guard Lock concept for Strandeiland that facilitates the management of water level fluctuations while accounting for potential failure mechanisms. Dimensions for the Guard Lock were determined based on the standard vessel, leading to lock cham- bers measuring 22 meters in length and 7.6 meters in width. Anticipating approximately ten annual guard lock closures in extreme scenarios, the F/E system is not included initially. To facilitate a possi- ble future inclusion of a F/E system, the core dimensions are based on two lock chambers resulting in an overall structural length of 36.46 meters.
Different gate designs were evaluated for the guard lock design: Mitre Gates, Rolling/Sliding gates, Lift gate (submersible), Lift gate (upward direction), Radial gates and Single-leaf gates. The first step was to check whether the different gate types were suitable for the situation in which Strandeiland is, looking at space and and vertical clearance. The lift gate in upward direction and the rolling sliding gate were considered unsuitable for this purpose. The elevator gate limits vertical clearance and the rolling sliding gates takes to much space besides to the lock. The remaining gate types were measured in a multi-criteria analysis, which resulted in a double set of mitre gates ensuring both-way retention. Because of safety and energy efficiency, but especially because of local knowledge and possibilities for maintenance, electromechanical driving mechanisms were chosen for the gates instead of an hydraulic driving mechanism.
Key design elements of the core construction of the guard lock consist of the concrete structure con- sisting of the walls and the floor slab. After performing the stability checks for the bearing capacity, overturning and piping the strength calculations are done for the floor slab and the walls of the con- crete structure. The reinforcement calculations are providing detailed reinforcements for the floor slab and walls.
The pile foundation is another main component of the structure. The vertical bearing capacity check indicates that no pile foundation is needed, but because non uniform settlement is expected a pile foun- dation will be included. Three different layers were evaluated to check which one was the best fit for the guard lock of Strandeiland. As the first layer is determined to be suitable to bear the load of the structure, this layer has been used. This is the most cost effective for the pile foundation design, as there is less material needed for the pile foundation design. The calculations show that 45 piles with an diameter of 0.8 m each satisfies the need to prevent non-uniform settlements under the structure.
The last component which has been determined is the gate height. The process for determining gate height utilized Reliability-Based Design (RBD) principles. Reliability-Based Design (RBD) ensures the gate height is optimal in terms of cost and safety. In this way an effective design for the gate height is obtained. A comprehensive fault tree analysis, combined with a Monte Carlo analysis, established the final gate height at 5.05 meters corresponding to NAP + 1.55 m, as shown in Figure 1.