Can You Hear It? Backdoor Attacks via Ultrasonic Triggers
S. Koffas (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Jing Xu (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Mauro Conti (TU Delft - Cyber Security, Università degli Studi di Padova)
Stjepan Picek (TU Delft - Cyber Security, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
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Abstract
This work explores backdoor attacks for automatic speech recognition systems where we inject inaudible triggers. By doing so, we make the backdoor attack challenging to detect for legitimate users and, consequently, potentially more dangerous. We conduct experiments on two versions of a speech dataset and three neural networks and explore the performance of our attack concerning the duration, position, and type of the trigger. Our results indicate that less than 1% of poisoned data is sufficient to deploy a backdoor attack and reach a 100% attack success rate. We observed that short, non-continuous triggers result in highly successful attacks. Still, since our trigger is inaudible, it can be as long as possible without raising any suspicions making the attack more effective. Finally, we conduct our attack on actual hardware and saw that an adversary could manipulate inference in an Android application by playing the inaudible trigger over the air.
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