An alternative intuitionistic version of Mally's deontic logic
Journal Article
(2016)
Author(s)
Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst (TU Delft - Ethics & Philosophy of Technology)
Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
Copyright
© 2016 G.J.C. Lokhorst
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.4467/20842589RM.16.003.5280
To reference this document use:
https://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:f64605f3-0e15-456f-8a16-1ed4ba720c7b
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Publication Year
2016
Language
English
Copyright
© 2016 G.J.C. Lokhorst
Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology
Issue number
51
Pages (from-to)
35-41
Reuse Rights
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Abstract
Some years ago, Lokhorst proposed an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic (1926). This reformulation was unsatisfactory, because it provided a striking theorem that Mally himself did not mention. In this paper, we present an alternative reformulation of Mally's deontic logic that does not provide this theorem.