Strategic Bidding in Decentralized Collaborative Vehicle Routing

Conference paper (2022)

Authors

J. Los Transport Engineering and Logistics - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
F. Schulte Transport Engineering and Logistics - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
M.T.J. Spaan Algorithmics - EEMCS
R.R. Negenborn Transport Engineering and Logistics - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
Research Group
Transport Engineering and Logistics (Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2022 J. Los, F. Schulte, M.T.J. Spaan, R.R. Negenborn
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05359-7_21
Strategic behaviour Multi-agent system Auctions Collaborative vehicle routing Decentralized collaborations
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Published Date

2022

Language

English

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Faculty

Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering

Department

Marine and Transport Technology

Research Group

Transport Engineering and Logistics

Abstract

Collaboration in transportation is important to reduce costs and emissions, but carriers may have incentives to bid strategically in decentralized auction systems. We investigate what the effect of the auction strategy is on the possible cheating benefits in a dynamic context, such that we can recommend a method with lower chances for carriers to cheat. We consider both a first-price auction system and a second-price auction scheme. Contrary to what was expected, a second-price auction scheme gives more room for successful strategic behaviour, while it also results in more rejected orders. A first-price auction scheme might be useful in practice if the profit shares that are allocated to the winner of an auction are selected carefully.