Print Email Facebook Twitter Homeowner Effect and Strategic Interaction in Local Property Taxation Part of: ERES 2017: 24th Annual Conference of the European Real Estate Society· list the conference papers Title Homeowner Effect and Strategic Interaction in Local Property Taxation Author Füss, Roland Lerbs, Oliver Date 2017-07-01 Abstract This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of households owning their homes in a community affects residential property taxation by local governments. Homeowners bear full property tax burdens irrespective of local market conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Home owner communities” may hence oppose high property taxes in local elections in order to protect their housing wealth. Using granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census and war-related housing damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide empirical evidence confirming that otherwise identical jurisdictions choose significantly lower property tax multipliers when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. This result appears to be independent of local housing market conditions, which suggests tax salience as the key mechanism for this effect. We find strong positive spatial dependence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments. Subject Homeownership ratepublic financingresidential property taxspatial tax mimickingyardstick competition To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6cec4a03-3d51-4c29-be03-d786622a3912 Part of collection Conference proceedings Document type conference paper Rights (c) 2017 The Author(s) Files PDF 21 Homeowner Effect and S ... action.pdf 1.2 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:6cec4a03-3d51-4c29-be03-d786622a3912/datastream/OBJ/view