On Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games & Their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory of Incentives

Doctoral thesis (2009)

Authors

Contributors

G.J. Olsder (promotor)
M.C.J. Bliemer (promotor)
Department
Delft Institute of Applied mathematics (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2009 Stankova, K.
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Published Date

02-02-2009

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Delft Institute of Applied mathematics

Abstract

This thesis studies the so-called inverse Stackelberg games, that are new in the world of game theory, their properties, and their applications in the optimal toll design problem, the energy markets liberalization problem, and in the theory of incentives.